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ABSTRACT 
 
SOUTHIE VERSUS ROXBURY:  
CRIME, WELFARE, AND THE RACIALIZED GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS 
OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
 
SEPTEMBER 2014 
 
DANIEL T. KIRSCH, B.A., UNION COLLEGE 
 
M.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY 
 
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Associate Professor Dean E. Robinson 
 
Racial and ethnic divisions at the national level and their effects on politics take on an 
abstract character when not discussing specific communities.  To obtain a reliable, 
consistent, and potentially reliable measure of a relationship, demographic information 
and voting behaviors at the small community, submetropolitan level must be examined in 
high-turnout, same-office elections over a protracted period, ideally in a polity with a 
penchant for racial tolerance.  The political language of Boston has been mired in 
racialization since at least the Civil Rights era, particularly since the Boston 
antisegregation busing crisis of the 1970s.  While previous research has focused on the 
busing crisis itself as a marker of national politicization of local ethnic and racial 
cleavages, the focus has not been on the consistently central political conversation of 
Massachusetts to demonstrate both the totality of the rhetorical and electoral focus on 
racial divisions and the immediate effect of such strategies on the respective racially 
predominant communities of Boston.  Through archival research in combination with 
demographic and electoral data, it can be observed Massachusetts statewide political 
candidates, alternately nominated by the two major parties, completely adopted the 
Reagan strategy of poverty-shaming and race-baiting that had gained success during his 
three campaigns for the presidency and his successor’s successful linkage of that strategy 
to Massachusetts itself.  It was in the post-Reagan era that this strategy found a 
permanent home with Republicans, who won four consecutive gubernatorial elections by 
utilizing this strategy, activating the white-working class neighborhoods of Boston while 
alienating the majority-black neighborhoods.  In order to maintain the new base of white 
working-class voters, each new Republican candidate had to adopt the previous formulaic 
combination of rhetoric and policy planks, no matter how inappropriate or irrelevant such 
positions and rhetoric were with each successive election.  Gains were consolidated by 
credit-claiming about the policies enacted during Republican administrations to further 
disadvantage the so-called underclass, populated by social welfare beneficiaries and 
drug-affiliated criminals. These policies were political ends in themselves to further the 
Reaganite political program for the next successive election until the strategy reached the 
point of diminishing returns when racial diversity reached a critical mass in Boston in the 
early 21st Century. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Racial and ethnic divisions at the national level and their effects on politics take 
on an abstract character when not discussing specific communities.  To obtain a reliable, 
consistent, and potentially reliable measure of a relationship, demographic information 
and voting behaviors at the small community, submetropolitan level must be examined in 
high-turnout, same-office elections over a protracted period, ideally in a polity with a 
penchant for racial tolerance.  The political language of Boston has been mired in 
racialization since at least the Civil Rights era, particularly since the Boston 
antisegregation busing crisis of the 1970s.  While previous research has focused on the 
busing crisis itself as a marker of national politicization of local ethnic and racial 
cleavages, the focus has not been on the consistently central political conversation of 
Massachusetts to demonstrate both the totality of the rhetorical and electoral focus on 
racial divisions and the immediate effect of such strategies on the respective racially 
predominant communities of Boston.   
Through archival research in combination with demographic and electoral data, it 
can be observed Massachusetts statewide political candidates, alternately nominated by 
the two major parties, completely adopted the Reagan strategy of poverty-shaming and 
race-baiting that had gained success during his three campaigns for the presidency and 
his successor’s successful linkage of that strategy to Massachusetts itself.  It was in the 
post-Reagan era that this strategy found a permanent home with Republicans, who won 
four consecutive gubernatorial elections by utilizing this strategy, activating the white-
working class neighborhoods of Boston while alienating the majority-black 
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neighborhoods.  In order to maintain the new base of white working-class voters, each 
new Republican candidate had to adopt the previous formulaic combination of rhetoric 
and policy planks, no matter how inappropriate or irrelevant such positions and rhetoric 
were with each successive election.  Gains were consolidated by credit-claiming about 
the policies enacted during Republican administrations to further disadvantage the so-
called underclass, populated by social welfare beneficiaries and drug-affiliated criminals. 
These policies were political ends in themselves to further the Reaganite political 
program for the next successive election until the strategy reached the point of 
diminishing returns when racial diversity reached a critical mass in Boston in the early 
21st Century. 
By examining demographic and partisan changes in the city of Boston from 1970 
to 2010, this study asks if there a link between the inaccurate but heavily implied racial 
tropes and stereotypes concerning issues like welfare and crime, and the fortunes of 
Republican candidates for governor in the state of Massachusetts.  
Were one to exist, Boston could lay claim to the title as the capital of white 
American cities. Of the 366 metropolitan areas in the United States, Greater Boston ranks 
10th in total population, and 5th in total non-Hispanic white population, as of the 2010 
Census.  Of the ten largest metropolitan areas, Greater Boston has by far the highest non-
Hispanic white percentage of the population, at 75%.  In the 2010 census the percentage 
of white residents dropped to 47% compared to more than 50% in 2000.1 Compared to 
other major cities in the Northeast, Boston has always had a larger percentage of white 
residents. In 1950, for example, Boston had a higher proportion of white residents than 
New York, from both the city and regional perspective.  
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 The black population in the city of Boston alone is one of the oldest and most 
established in the United States. The proportion of total black residents in the city has 
remained virtually unchanged in the last five decades, at just over twenty percent. The 
black population in absolute terms (150,000) is greater than the black populations of 
Newark, New Jersey; Jackson, Mississippi; Montgomery, Alabama; and only slightly less 
than Cleveland, Ohio; New Orleans, Louisiana; St. Louis, Missouri; or Atlanta, Georgia. 
The black population in Greater Boston is almost double that number.   
In terms of other racial and ethnic groups, Boston has a substantial Asian- 
American population and a growing Latino one. More than a quarter-million Asian-
Americans reside in the region, and the emerging Latino population in the region has 
surpassed 400,000.  
Despite important demographic chances in the past decades, the city of Boston is 
very segregated. This is clear from the city’s black-white dissimilarity index of housing 
nationally, which scores city of Boston as 75 out of 100, which is considered “very 
high.”2 
Thus white Bostonians are not likely to share a residential area with Bostonians 
identified with a racial or ethnic minority.  Historically white neighborhoods such as the 
upscale Beacon Hill, the nearby Back Bay, the Irish American stronghold of South 
Boston, and the Italian American North End are worlds apart from historically black 
Roxbury and the majority-black neighborhoods of Dorchester.  
According to some scholars, the United States has witnessed something of a “sea 
change” in racial attitudes in this now-passing generational era.3 Following the successful 
election of President Obama in 2008 and, before that Governor Deval Patrick in 2006, 
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this might appear to be the case. But for at least two decades prior, many white Boston 
residents showed anything but a willingness to transcend racial attitudes. Indeed, as this 
study will demonstrate from 1970 to 2010, white allegiance to the Republican Party in 
greater Boston can be clearly identified and accounts for the Republican Party’s success 
in gubernatorial elections. The key has been a strategy that denies the national party’s 
emphasis on lifestyle-oriented issues such as religion, marriage equality, abortion and 
contraception, but does rely on what this study will refer to as “racial conservatism.”4 If 
conservatism refers to a philosophy of limited government, less regulated markets, and 
the maintenance and promotion of “traditional” values, racial conservatism refers to the 
policy emphasis on those domains in which minorities are central to the narrative. At 
least since the 1960s, those policies have included welfare, criminal justice, affirmative 
action, and, more recently, immigration.    
Republicans in Massachusetts have been more successful in winning statewide 
offices than their enrollment numbers would have predicted.  Despite a 5-to-1 
Democratic advantage in party enrollment, Republicans won four straight gubernatorial 
races in the 1990s and early 2000s.5 They did this through a language and policy of racial 
conservatism. This meant opposition to social welfare, promotion of “tough-on-crime” 
policies such as the death penalty and mandatory minimum sentencing, as well as 
“nonracial” positions on tax and revenue reduction. Recently, Republican candidates to 
state offices have championed policies that are decidedly hostile to immigration, as other 
Republican parties in New England have done.6 
Over this era, partisanship among Boston neighborhoods is striking. As this study 
will show, the racial and ethnic composition of city wards is strongly correlated to the 
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support for Republican candidates for governor. The so-called “black wards” of Boston 
consistently rejected statewide (and national) Republican candidates since Governor 
Sargent in 1974. Indeed Roxbury, the home to the greatest number of black residents in 
the state, historically and presently, virtually never votes the same way as South Boston 
which remains predominantly white.7  
Methodological Overview 
Through construction of an 1) historical political narrative; 2) the utilization of of 
statistical data on racial/ethnic demographics and electoral outcomes; and 3) content 
analysis of campaign speeches and political statements, we can observe how each 
neighborhood responded to racial conservatism in gubernatorial politics. This dissertation 
therefore offers a city-level view of racial conservatism in gubernatorial elections.  
Data 
1. This study drew on an exhaustive body of secondary scholarship on the history of 
Boston, and related work on urban politics that takes Boston as a central case. This 
literature establishes the developments that both sets Boston apart from other cities, 
but also illustrates the way the trends are representative of patterns common to the 
Northeastern United States. Furthermore, to construct the historical context in racial 
and ethnic residential patterns, partisanship trends and relevant political and 
economic developments that establish the context of the study. 
2. The data comes mainly from the City of Boston, the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, United States Census, the Boston Globe, and the Boston 
Redevelopment Authority (BRA).  The BRA uses the same ward boundaries drawn 
by the Boston City Council in 1925 and that are used by the city and the state to set 
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election boundaries within the city at the city government, state government, and 
congressional district level.  The data cannot be reliable as they come from official 
sources at the City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in their 
annual election reports.  Through several special requests to the City Clerk’s office, 
precinct-level data from the major elections from 1995-2005 were obtained. The rest 
were on the website the city maintains.8  The state’s annual report “Massachusetts 
Election Statistics” was used to confirm the data found at the city level.9 Although 
data on race and partisanship exist in the period preceding the 1990s, the reliability 
and consistency of the available partisan and racial data only fully coincides during 
the 1980-2010 period.10  Thanks to a thorough archive of Boston city election returns, 
not only are citywide returns possible, but so are neighborhood returns.   
3. Through an historical analysis of campaign rhetoric and themes as reported by the 
newspapers and through television advertisements and official speeches (in Chapter 
4), the extent of racially focused content in gubernatorial campaigns will be 
considered.  As scholars of racism in American politics have noted, we would expect 
Republicans to rely on coded, anti-minority appeals after 1968, as hypothesized by 
both Carmines and Stimson (1989), as well as Mendelberg (2001).  Particular focus 
on crime and welfare after the 1960s is the hallmark of Republican strategy, 
especially in regards to the white constituent support they wish to reach.  Information 
on campaign rhetoric is from the Boston Globe, which is the flagship paper of Boston 
and New England.  It regularly reports on the transforming nature of Boston’s 
neighborhoods, and it also reports regularly, of course, on partisan campaign rhetoric 
utilized in the state. To the extent that ads themselves have mobilization 
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consequences or are controversial, they are reported in the Boston Globe.  The Globe 
endorses candidates, and it delivers daily newspapers more than just to the city of 
Boston.  It has a massive circulation in the greater Boston area, and penetration 
beyond the borders of Massachusetts.  In short, the Boston Globe’s beat is all of New 
England. The study also attempted to draw on platform data, but platforms ceased 
being printed in the Boston Globe after 1972, and few candidates or party members 
read them today.  Campaigns are analyzed here in the speeches, writings, public 
statements, and campaign commercials that.11   
Methods: The Research Question and Case Selection 
Gerring notes in his explanation of how explanatory variables can exist without a 
multiplicity of cases, that “what distinguishes the case study method from all other 
methods is its reliance on covariation demonstrated by a single unit.” Further, the case 
study method attempts to “illuminate features of a broader set of units.”(343) For this 
analysis, the within unit variation over time is essential to the analysis. This study looks 
at patterns of racial and ethnic demographic characteristics of neighborhoods, alongside 
indicators of party support over time. If racial conservatism shapes the electoral fortunes 
of Republican candidates for state office in Boston,  it becomes the “crucial case” 
according to Gerring.12  
Why Boston? 
Some additional points about Boston as a case are worth considering. First, 
Boston is a city with historically low diversity but with a reputation for liberalism, as 
evidenced by support for the Democratic Party. Second, it is also a city in which race has 
been a visible point of conflict in city politics, so much so that politicians like Reagan 
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and Nixon both alluded to and capitalized upon political developments in that city (read: 
busing). Third, the Boston area itself is both geographically and culturally almost 
synonymous with New England. The utility of studying Boston, however, is not its 
disproportionate numerical influence in the state, but in its role as the “Hub” that actually 
sets trends and drives change culturally, economically, politically, and racially in the 
state. Finally, insofar as Boston shares a media market with New Hampshire, home of the 
first-in-the-nation primary since 1952, Boston voters/readers are something a barometer 
for appeal and influence of certian types of political rhetoric.  
Why Gubernatorial Contests? 
Another methodological choice that was made was to study the gubernatorial 
elections themselves, without attention to state legislature or statewide legislative races. 
There is a simple reason for this decision: it is the grandest and most noticeable office in 
the city of Boston, even exceeding the mayor, and it straddles the line between city and 
suburb.  It occupies the “corner office” on historical Beacon Hill, indicating the center of 
power in the city.  It is thus the most visible and most popular political office in Boston, 
and the most competitive. The turnout levels, campaign spending, rhetoric, and overall 
strategy seem to reflect that level of attention.  It is also notable that gubernatorial 
elections have only been midterm elections since 1966.  Formerly, they were biennial 
elections, thus this newer calendar opens up new possibilities for study.  Further, it 
demonstrates the degree to which Massachusetts governors and politicians in general 
have come to occupy a central place in American politics in the last half-century. Surely 
the breeding ground for nationally prominent politicians deserves the spotlight in a way 
that perhaps no other state does.  Finally, if the center of Massachusetts culture is indeed 
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the Hub of Boston, then learning how they win or lose elections in their backyard is vital 
to understanding the dynamics and parameters of national political debate.   
 
Conclusion 
Boston and Massachusetts politics are reflective and constitutive of national 
trends. For example, Reagan rhetorically attacked the poor black population of the United 
States in speeches first to Boston-area voters in both 1976 and 1980.  Indeed, the 
foremost example of racialized television advertising, the Willie Horton/tough-on-crime 
campaign of George Bush in 1988 was directed at the Democratic presidential nominee 
and Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis, whose Massachusetts Republican 
opponents had unearthed the story and fed it to the Bush campaign. By the time of the 
next state election, in 1990, Democrats and Republicans were racing to distance 
themselves from Dukakis-style “liberal” governance.   
The outline for the dissertation is as follows: 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature related to historical and urban studies of 
race and politics in the United States, especially drawing from the subfields of American 
Political Development, survey research on implicit racial bias in U.S. elections, and urban 
politics and history. 
Chapter 3 discusses the characteristics, racial/ethnic and political, of 
neighborhoods of Boston themselves. It also explores the trend of white migration to the 
suburbs and how the Republican party has been able to capitalize on that trend. 
Chapter 4 examines the trends presented in chapter 3 in relation to gubernatorial 
contests in the state. The racial conservatism evident in Republican candidates’ speeches, 
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which resonate with suburban white constituents of the Greater Boston region, and to a 
consistent and discernible subset of majority white neighborhoods in the city.  
In Chapter 5, the study reiterates the main findings and considers the implications 
with respect to new developments in Boston city politics, state politics, and the broader 
national landscape of race and politics in the United States.
Notes 
1
 Census data collected by US2010: Discover America in a New Century, a project of Brown University 
and the Russell Sage Foundation, found at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/index.htm. 
2 http://www.censusscope.org/us/rank_dissimilarity_white_black.html. For a visual representation of this 
phenomenon, see: The definition used by CensusScope, a nonprofit that utilizes census data to generate 
reports, defines it this way: “The dissimilarity index measures the relative separation or integration of 
groups across all neighborhoods of a city or metropolitan area. If a city's white-black dissimilarity index 
were 65, that would mean that 65% of white people would need to move to another neighborhood to make 
whites and blacks evenly distributed across all neighborhoods. 
(http://www.censusscope.org/us/s40/p75000/chart_dissimilarity.html) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-cities-census-maps-2013-4?op=1. 
3
 Bryant II, Wilbur. "Racist Propensities of Whites in Black/White Relationships versus Racist Propensities 
of Whites in Endogamous Relationships" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 16, 2003, 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p106033_index.html. 
3For a public intellectual take on what this phenomenon means politically, see “A Job Too Big for One 
Man” by Orlando Patterson, April 4, 2009, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/opinion/04patterson.html?_r=0. 
3For a statistical look at this phenomenon, one brief study of the Millenial generation is a helpful look: “6 
new findings about Millennials” by Bruce Drake, March 7, 2014  
3
 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/07/6-new-findings-about-millennials/ 
4 Prominent actors such as William F. Weld have indeed publicly denounced the national party’s platform 
in those areas, while still maintaining a viable state party that shares the same name.  
5Weld and Scott Brown,Republicans in the state saw no statewide victories in the 1980s for either the U.S. 
Senate or the corner office, or in any other constitutional office.   
6
 See 2006 Massachusetts Republican Party Platform.  
7
 The one exception being 1990, in which the Democratic candidate had explicitly defamed the Roxbury 
neighborhood as “a bunch of drug addicts.” 
8
 “Election Results” at City of Boston.gov, http://www.cityofboston.gov/elections/results/, accessed June 
12, 2014. 
9
 Massachusetts Election Results at www.archive.org. 
10Several reports from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, with special thanks to Minsheng Kang and 
Mark Melnik from the BRA. 
11Most were found on videos of historical candidate campaign statements and debates, and other public 
speeches on C-Span.org. 
12
 See Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RACE, CITIES, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The following review of scholarly literature concerning the relationship between 
conservatism and race (racism) draws from these research streams: 1) race and American 
political development; 2) survey and experimental research on implicit appeals to anti-
black and anti-Latino sentiment; 3) studies that follow evolution of white perceptions 
about welfare and crime in the United States; and 3) urban politics.  
Race and American Political Development 
Race and American Political development represents a subset of a broader 
scholarship on “American Political Development” although researchers in the former 
would suggest that there is no meaningful way to separate the two. The subfield of 
American political development (APD) has features that separate it from the dominant, 
behavior approach in political science. Scholars working within this tradition often use 
historical and comparative methodologies to examine development and change in 
American politics.  Most of the work in APD relies on detailed historical analysis and 
draws upon primary and secondary sources in order to explain political and policy 
outcomes.  The study of the “the state” itself and the democratic (or not) nature of formal 
institutions (such as political parties) is central to the APD mission of historical 
scholarship for deeper and more comprehensive understanding of politics. APD scholars 
thus pay careful attention to the state and political institutions. 
The race and APD scholarship considers the ways racial ideologies interact with 
state formation and institutional development to produce political and policy outcomes. 
As with the broader APD field, ideas and institutions are carefully considered. The 
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seminal work is Rogers Smith’s Civic Ideals.1 In an exhaustive examination of federal 
case material, Smith shows that three traditions interact to shape beliefs about citizenship 
in the United States: liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive Americanism. 
Much of Smith’s work has also helped define the field of race in American 
Political Development, and the larger field of APD itself.  Rogers Smith and Desmond 
King, in a recent book that followed two earlier articles, have created the framework of 
“racial alliances” to explain the terrain of race and American politics. The essence of 
their thesis concerns “alliances” which are “coalitions of state institutions and other 
political actors and organizations that seek to secure and exercise governing power in 
demographically, economically, and ideologically structured contexts that define the 
range of opportunities open to political actors.”2 Thus, racial alliances themselves are 
central to American politics, and institutional structures have been built on the foundation 
of racial orders attempting to perpetuate their own power.  
Through examples that look at the presidential politics of Andrew Jackson, 
Andrew Johnson, and Harry Truman, King and Smith deftly argue that American 
political leaders tend to enlist black and white racial differences to their advantages, so 
long as the championing of a racially charged cause can assist in furthering existing 
political goals. Those goals may coincide with racialized values of the American 
electorate. For example, most white Americans in the pre-World War II period were not 
bothered by the racial segregation of public and private facilities, which, in turn, 
encouraged the formation of segregated labor unions and activist organizations such as 
the National Negro Congress and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. This 
mobilization of northern black activists and workers was instrumental in the Civil Rights 
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movement despite the fact that members of these organizations were predominantly from 
the northern cities that lay outside the supposedly peculiar American South. 
Where King and Smith’s work is perhaps most helpful is through the prism of 
negotiating the increasingly variegated demands between racial alliances. What was once 
a self-perpetuating, path-dependent set of institutions created to encourage new purchase 
into an aging assembly of politically powerful elite actors, is now more than ever subject 
to crosscurrents of age, class, and gender which themselves attempt to form alliances of 
political difference that privilege particular identities.  
Klinkner and Smith’s The Unsteady March (1999) builds the case that significant 
progress toward racial equality can occur only under certain, historically infrequent, 
conditions.3 In a breathtaking sweep of the historical record, these authors identify the 
“political opportunity structure” in three factors that together equal the formula for racial 
change (though not necessarily occurring simultaneously or in concert): 1) military 
mobilization necessitating black enlistment, 2) patriotic themes of inclusion and 
democracy when battling a foreign power that seems apparently to lack such values, 3) 
and protest movements that force political leaders to respond to calls for remembering 
those values.4 They also find that periods of progress are always followed by 
retrenchment. 
In keeping with the historical tradition of American Political Development, 
Klinkner and Smith draw on the past to offer insight to the present. They identify “eleven 
significant similarities in the policy and political debates of the late nineteenth century 
and the current era.”5 These similarities include rhetoric focusing on state and local 
authority, the “color-blind” argument in political discourse, laissez-faire liberalism’s 
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popularity, and a tendency toward emphasizing and promoting the imagery of black 
criminality by the dominant white racial alliance. 
Ira Katznelson, in his titular “coda” to The City in American Political 
Development, celebrates the return to attention to urban studies within the discipline of 
political science and discusses the importance of cities to American political 
development.6  To learn the “structure and behavior in American political history” as 
Katznelson puts it, such attention is essential.  Katznelson offers a similar view of 
“orders” (later “alliances”) elaborated by Smith and King. The goal for understanding 
city politics historically is to “examine the quest by machine politicians and reformers 
alike to bias political participation in order to secure power.” He paints with a fairly 
broad brush that calls for looking at statewide actors who campaign explicitly against or 
appeal to certain populations within an urban regime. 
Katznelson’s primary exhortation is one of further research into the hows and 
whys of social interaction among peoples of different groups, often divided by race, class, 
or religion. He also urges careful examination of how political institutions treat minority 
groups within urban political regimes. Katznelson believes that cities are fertile ground in 
the American Political Development tradition of attempting to reconcile constitutional 
democracies founded upon a social contract of toleration, with deep and increasing 
polarization because of their ever-present tendency toward heterogeneity. For Katznelson 
city politics are not only about city government actors or candidates. They are inclusive 
of, and even drivers of, regional and state, and sometimes national politics.  
Under the broad umbrella of American Political Development scholarship, a 
relatively recent work by Robert Smith is elevant to the present study. In Racism and 
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Conservatism (2010) Smith argues that what is usually called “systemic racism” is 
virtually synonymous with conservatism in America.7 Smith traces the “Conservative 
Movement” in America to rise of Ronald Reagan and his presidency.  Conservatism in 
America, he posits, is unique compared to others around the world because it cannot be 
linked to an historical order that does not rest on racial hierarchy. American 
conservatism has its roots in the evolution of slavery and capitalism. 
His thesis is compelling. Smith points out that Reagan began his 1980 campaign 
for president in Philadelphia, Mississippi, a small town with no distinguishing features 
other than it was the site where three young civil rights workers were murdered by Ku 
Klux Klan members in cooperation with local authorities in 1963.  Reagan invoked 
“states’ rights,” which Smith rightly identifies as code for racial segregation, in his 
speech several times. Here Reagan was not defending federal intervention for civil rights, 
but opposing it.8  Perhaps the clearest expression of Smith’s thesis is the following 
assertion:  
Although Reagan perhaps protested too much and too often, it is the argument of 
this chapter that his antiblack policies derive not from his racial views but from 
his ideology. That is, it was Reagan’s doctrinaire, principled Lockean 
conservatism that resulted in racist policies and practices.  This conservatism 
required him to oppose any use of government power to secure civil rights for 
black people because to do so violated core conservative principles of limited 
government, individual liberty, and states’ rights.9 
 
Smith further articulates the striking correlation between the rise of the 
conservative movement to white reaction to and rejection of policy benefits derived from 
civil rights laws and War on Poverty programs. The figure of 1964 Republican 
presidential nominee Barry Goldwater figures significantly into his argument, as well, in 
that it was the first clear example of the Republican party capitalizing on racial 
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resentment in an open, combative manner that would soon evolved to a central place in 
American political conversation. As Robert Smith explains: 
There is a near political science consensus on the significance of the 1964 election 
in reshaping the partisan relationship between racism and conservatism in the 
United States.  Carmines and Stimson, who pioneered in studying this race based 
partisan shift, saw that during the 1950s and early 1960s, the key issue that 
distinguished liberals from conservatives centered on the New Deal. During this 
period, such attitudes had no correlation with issues of race.  Beginning with the 
1964 election, however, this pattern began to change. Race increasingly became 
the key issue that divided left and right sides of the political spectrum and 
organized peoples’ attitudes on a variety of other issues--including what by then 
were closely associated questions of social welfare policy.  Race was now the 
central issue cleavage in partisan politics.10  
 
According to Smith, Reagan felt compelled to both make significant cuts in social 
programs that disproportionately benefitted black Americans and also roll back most 
enforcement of civil rights legislation to the extent he was able to exercise discretion in 
his role as the chief executive, and his support for these actions among his electoral base 
of support was apparent in his resounding victories in 1980, 1984, and the election of his 
successor in 1988. 
Leaders of the Democratic party soon appreciated the ways racial resentment 
could be used for the purpose of winning elections.  In 1984 and 1992, respectively, 
leaders of the party had commissioned studies that found working-class white voters were 
being lured to the Republican side simply through appeals to racial resentment and 
stereotype, the so-called “Reagan Democrats.” Politicians like Bill Clinton eventually 
employed the same strategy. In his campaign for the White House, Clinton condemned 
the rapper-activist “Sister Souljah”  for comments in which she seemingly agreed that 
black rioters in Los Angeles should kill police officers after the Rodney King verdict. His 
condemnation was widely seen as a symbolic gesture to distance himself from the 
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association of the Democratic party to African Americans. In that year, Clinton also left 
the campaign trail to oversee the execution of a mentally disabled black man, Ricky Ray 
Rector.  With these and other examples, Smith demonstrates that at the national level, 
race had already been a prominent and perhaps decisive factor in American national 
politics decades before the election of the nation’s first black president.   
Feagin too makes the case that the Republican party relies on whiteness to get 
elected and thus governs primarily for whites. Whiteness and white supremacy are 
collective political identities which see as inevitable, or at least currently desirable, the 
predominance of white political power in the United States.  Through his “White Racial 
Frame” Feagin makes a historical case that the white view of American development has 
been the dominant view, and that it has required the demeaning of African-Americans 
and Native Americans. This has been true, he demonstrates, from the European and 
British colonial era through the Founding of the Republic, and into the modern political 
era.   His work is even more historically thoroughgoing than Smith’s, and he takes the 
reader through into the progression of each era of the white racial “undemocratic” frame 
into the modern day.  Feagin too mentions the Goldwater-inspired “Southern Strategy” as 
Robert Smith does, but makes clear that these patterns were discernible before the 1960s. 
For example, in “Urban Black Revolts and White Reactions,” he provides evidence that 
white conceptions of black behavior as “criminal” were clear also in the 1930s and 1940s 
with talk of a “negro problem.” 
By the time of the Reagan administration itself, Feagin explores how the focus of 
U.S. policy shifted from a War on Poverty to the War on Drugs. Tighter and more 
punitive law enforcement has created “black criminality”:  “Having a record, they often 
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lose the right to vote, serve on juries, get decent-paying jobs, rent public housing, and 
secure normal loans of various kinds.  As a result of these state-imposed difficulties, they 
frequently end up back in prison.”11  
Throughout the 1990s era of Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole and throughout the 
George W. Bush Administration, Feagin builds the case that the Republican Party moved 
so forcefully to capture white votes that it compelled the Democratic Party to employ 
similar strategies. What is unique about Feagin’s treatment, however, is his 
characterization of the white racial frame as an authoritarian frame.  He describes his 
definition of authoritarianism thus, in describing the work of 1940s social scientist T.W. 
Adorno: 
For decades now, social scientists have found many close ties between the 
authoritarian orientations of whites and their negative and hostile attitudes toward 
specific racial and ethnic outgroups...These researchers found that those with 
more authoritarian socio-political views differed from those with less 
authoritarian views in their greater willingness to submit to authority, their 
tendency to be fearful of and stereotype others, and their great concern for social 
ranking and the status quo.12  
 
This is not necessarily a unique formulation in itself, but very interesting in its 
application to racial division in the United States. As Feagin explains “Social science 
research indicates that the level of societal threat can make a difference in the activation 
of strong authoritarian views,” and playing to fears to the social order—crime in the 
1980s and terrorism after 2001—has been key to Republican success.13  
Symbolic or Implicit Racism 
 For several decades, social scientists in the behavioral tradition have studied and 
debated the change in racial attitudes since the 1960s, and how these changes related to 
political developments over time.14 Numerous studies have show that symbolic racism is 
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associated with whites’ racial policy preferences. Symbolic racism refers to the following 
beliefs: 
(1) blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination; 
(2) blacks’ failure to progress results from their unwillingness to work hard 
enough; 
(3) blacks are demanding too much too fast; and 
(4) blacks have gotten more than they deserve.15 
Sears & Henry (2002) point out that the theory of symbolic racism can predict whites’ 
policy preferences, outweighing other variables like ideology, party identification, and 
even, such things as beliefs in blacks’ genetic inferiority. The concept of symbolic racism 
is not only unique and distinguishable from traditional and more general conservatism, 
but is also a “blend of anti-black affect and individualistic values.16   
In her work on “racial priming” Tali D. Mendelberg takes insights from  the 
political science and sociological exploration of implicit bias.17  The essential thrust of 
her research is explicated thus in her 2009 work:  
Parties often, but not always, construct implicit appeals to mobilize racial stereotypes, 
fears, or resentments. But intent is a cause, not a characteristic, of racial appeals.  We 
cannot rely on intent alone to distinguish between implicit and nonracial appeals. I define 
an implicitly racial appeal as one that contains a recognizable, if subtle, racial reference. 
Implicit references can be visual or verbal. The modern norm of equality was established 
at the same time that television came into widespread use, so the party of the right has 
often made use of visual cues to construct its implicit racial appeals.  Television allows a 
party to separate the visual and verbal content of its communication. It can introduce 
racially loaded images but avoid using racial words that would alert viewers to the racial 
meaning of the message.18  
 
Mendelberg pioneered the serious analytical study of racial appeals through a 
mixed-method approach of experiments, survey research, and historiography. Her 
experiments consisted of showing a group a news segment featuring an African American 
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convicted felon and rapist, while another group saw a story about pollution in the Boston 
Harbor. As Mendleberg explains: 
 I measured participants’ level of racial resentment in advance of the experiment, 
then exposed them to their randomly assigned message, and then asked them a 
series of questions about their political opinions and predisposition . . . The results 
show that the implicit racial message primed racial resentment.  Resentful people 
exposed to the implicit message expressed more racially conservative opinions 
than their counterparts in the control condition (their opinions on nonracial 
matters remained similar to those of the control group).  Unresentful people 
showed no movement, except in a slightly more racially liberal direction.19 
 
In other words, Mendelberg’s results (which she references again in 2008 and 2009) 
show that “priming” occurs when implicitly racial campaign themes are emphasized and 
that this priming results in a direct political consequence of being more likely to support 
candidates that take more racially conservative public policy positions.  Such evidence 
has extraordinarily important implications.  
 Mendelberg reviewed political history for evidence of the use of implicit, coded 
appeals in U.S. elections and finds them in abundance. She argues that the “Race Card” 
has been played in political campaigns that have utilized racial “code words” to activate 
racial stereotypes and prejudices among whites.20 Those code words, as previously 
discussed, evoke negative views about blacks in those policy domains in which whites 
believe blacks are a problem (e.g. criminal justice, welfare, etc.). 
One point that Mendelberg asserts relevant to this study in her book wais that that 
gubernatorial elections are an appropriate barometer of the national mood, citing the 
success of several governors in 1994 and 1998 elections who championed their 
opposition to “crime” and “welfare.”21 She neglects to point out that these governors are 
largely elected during “midterm” elections halfway through and not coincident with 
election to the White House, and if anything those governors tend to reflect the desires of 
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a smaller, older, whiter, and ultimately more conservative electorate that votes during the 
midterms. Indeed, as will be seen in chapter 4, a former prosecutor in Reagan’s War on 
Crime, Bill Weld, swept every county in Massachusetts to win back the governor’s chair 
in his 1994 reelection campaign, citing his success in fighting crime and welfare, and 
giving very little time to much else.   
 Social welfare has become a routine topic of conversation during these midterm 
campaigns, as people are less focused on international and even national issues of 
concern to the federal government, despite the fact that Congress is also re-elected during 
these elections. Domestic concerns rule the day, and “domestic” might as well be 
synonymous with the term “social welfare” which encompasses the heavily racialized 
welfare state, the health care regime, education, and even the judicial system.  
Mendelberg has inspired her own followers, notably Charlton McIlwain and 
Stephen Caliendo, who have published a recent book22 that primarily examines the appeal 
to racial priming that occurs when a white candidate (usually a Republican) faces a 
candidate of a minority race (usually a Democrat).  Their contention is simply that there 
is a relatively small universe of terms and images that television and radio commercials 
can use to reinforce racial stereotypes that are both effective and still socially acceptable.  
They also look for this evidence where one would expect to find it, in, for example, the 
cases outlined above.   
McIlwain and Caliendo stay away from identifying racial appeals from candidates 
who target minority populations rather than their opponents. Although this approach 
excludes research into the history of racial appeals, this contribution is valuable in terms 
of identifying whether a candidate’s racial identity can be exploited during a major 
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political campaign, but that the approach must be coded and implicit, rather than explicit. 
This led the research team to examine several statewide campaigns, and of course into the 
2008 presidential campaign of John McCain against Barack Obama. 
The words McIlwain & Caliendo find used by most of white Republican 
candidates referring to themselves were “trustworthy” and “hardworking” while the 
references they made to the alternative candidate, a black Democrat, were 
“untrustworthy” “taking advantage” “liberal” and often “criminal.” All of these words, 
the authors assert, are racial code words used to reinforce stereotypes about black 
candidates that would be enough motivation to force voters to choose the white 
Republican who is “trustworthy” and “hardworking.”23  
Again, this work is tremendously valuable, but more work ought to be done of the 
sort Mendelberg has done, simply because there have been many more black in political 
ads than there have been black candidates, and much more mention of issues such as 
crime and welfare, as well. 
Crime, Welfare, and Racial Appeals in American Politics 
A significant body of work shows how racist stereotypes have produced 
disparities in poverty and welfare provision, and in rates of arrest and incarceration. 
These statistics—the disproportionate representation of blacks and other minorities on 
welfare and in prison—served to reproduce the stereotypes behind these patterns.  
In the area of criminal justice, the late Sociologist and Criminologist Coramae 
Richey Mann’s classic 1993 work, Unequal Justice, first demonstrated vast racial 
inequalities at virtually every stage of the criminal justice system. Mann cites both 
statistical and anecdotal data that demonstrates persuasive evidence of racial bias against 
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racial minorities at every stage of the criminal justice process.24  The chief accusations of 
racism against prosecutors focus on the decision to use peremptory jury challenges solely 
on the basis of race to exclude jurors from juries.  The statistics are compelling. Perhaps 
the more disturbing statistics are from the area of death sentences. A majority, 54.6 
percent of executions from 1930 to 1984, were for black defendants.  In virtually every 
study Mann cites, the presence racial discrimination in sentencing defendants to death 
should be an obvious conclusion of researchers. Further, 90% of those executions for 
rape and murder offenses were African-Americans during this time period.   
Mann showed that at every stage of the criminal justice system African-
Americans receive harsher treatment, from arrest to bail to plea bargaining (yet it is 
implied persuasively that African-Americans are more likely to try to plead guilty in 
hopes of a lesser sentence, whereas this lesser sentence almost never occurs) to jury 
selection, to indictment, to length of sentencing, to severity of sentencing, up to and 
including the death penalty.25 
While Unequal Justice pioneered the combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research into criminology, political science has been making severe inroads into the 
criminal justice in the form of the new concept of the “carceral state” meaning the 
network of institutions in the United States that increase the authority of the judicial/law 
enforcement/prison system at the expense of accepted definitions of liberal democracy. 
Much of this work implicitly and explicity explore the racial inequality inherent in the 
growth of the carceral state. Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman’s work has contributed 
significantly to the above literature. They have found that the criminal justice system 
today in the United States fundamentally has several characteristics. For instance, it is 
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racialized to the point of an inclination generally among police to profile black men and 
women in their routine police work26; create a system wherein black citizens have a 
fundamental distrust of their government as a result primarily of a history of negative 
contact with the criminal justice system;27 and it also disenfranchises a gigantic swath of 
the population, as it perpetuates racial differences, embedding them as class differences 
within American democracy with a series of steps in the process of incarceration that 
forbid re-entry into functioning citizenship.28 By conducting focus groups and field 
interviews with hundreds of previously incarcerated citizens, Lerman and Weaver have 
given voice to the unenfranchised in American democracy, exposing a massive rift 
between the concept and the execution of that ideal. 
Marie Gottschalk has also contributed original research to this burgeoning field 
with exhaustive research, putting the current administration of the carceral state within 
the context of American Political Development explicitly:   
The government now exercises vast new controls over millions of people, 
resulting in a remarkable change in the distribution of authority since the 1970s in 
favor of law enforcement and corrections at the local, state, and federal levels.  
Today the United States is the world’s warden, incarcerating a higher proportion 
of its people than any other country.  The United States has built a carceral state 
that is unprecedented among industrialized countries and in U.S. history.  The 
emergence and consolidation of the U.S. carceral state is a major milestone in 
American political development that arguably rivals in signficance the expansion 
and contraction of the welfare state in the postwar period[…]The carceral state 
has condemned millions of people in the Untied States to “civil death,”  denied 
core civil liberties and social benefits because of a criminal conviction. An 
estimated 6 million people have been disenfranchised either temporarily or 
permanently because of criminal conviction.  This is about 2.5 percent of the total 
U.S. voting-age population, or 1 in 40 adults (Uggen, Shannon, and Manza 2012, 
1). Millions of Americans have been denied federal benefits such as public 
housing, student loans, and food stamps due to their criminal records.  Thanks to a 
prior run-in with the law, many people are ineligible to receive state licenses for a 
range of occupations--from hairdressing to palm reading to nursing.29 
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Gottschalk’s real service to the discipline is not only a perspective on how wildly 
out of place the current system is within American political development, but also how 
out of step with the rest of the world the United States system is.   
Lawrence Bobo and Viktor Thompson’s “Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, 
Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,” find that African Americans 
and white Americans have significantly different views about the criminal justice 
system.30 Through an exploration of existing literature, public opinion, new surveys, and 
original focus groups, Bobo and Thompson reach this conclusion: “whether focused on 
the general character of the criminal justice system or specific sectors of it—such as 
judges and the courts, prosecutors, or police—African Americans by and large see a 
system suffused with racial bias, and most white Americans do not.”31  
Black and white Americans have different perceptions of the criminal justice 
systems, which are reinforced by entirely dissimilar probability of contact with the 
criminal justice system. Incarceration rates, as will be noted in chapter 4, are entirely 
disproportionate toward black offenders. The War on Drugs particularly has had a 
negative effect on the black population in the United States, with the population of 
incarcerated indviduals skyrocketing from 300,000 to well over 1 million in just twenty 
years, from 1980 to 2000, the majority of new inmates being African-American, despite 
constituting only 12 percent of the overall population.32 
Bobo and Thompson’s work takes a hard look at different perceptions, different 
treatment, different sentencing, and different political implications of what they call an 
obviously racialized system of incarceration in the United States. Their focus-group 
evidence is especially convincing, as it elaborates the narrative that ordinary Americans 
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have about the racialized nature of the criminal justice system. It also echoes Smith and 
Klinkner’s work in that it calls attention to the inequality in treatment and also in the 
perception by whites of a “color-blind” criminal justice system. 
Another stream of work looks at the relationship between racial inequality and 
social welfare in the United States. Jil Quadagno’s important The Color of Welfare 
(1994) traces the origins of social welfare policy from the 1930s and into the post-civil 
rights period.33 Quadagno shows how and why blacks and other minorities were excluded 
from key provisions of New Deal policy—like workers’ rights and unemployment 
insurance, and access to Federal Housing Assistance loans. Not surprisingly, through the 
century, African Americans trailed whites in socioeconomic status; and, in the 1960s 
when enrolment into Aid With Families With Depenent Children expanded, blacks were 
disproportionately represented.34 
 Robert C. Lieberman, in his seminal book, Shifting the Color Line (1998) 
highlights the vast evidence pointing to racial bias within the administration of social 
welfare systems in the United States, as well as their association of welfare in the popular 
mind with black and brown people.35  Like Quadagno, Lieberman traces the history of the 
welfare state in the United States since its purposeful founding in 1935 with the Social 
Secuirty Act. He divides his work into three parts, covering, respectively, AFDC (Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, also known commonly as “welfare”), UI 
(unemployment insurance), and OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, 
commonly known as “social security”).   
Lieberman carefully recounts the history in which politicians became obsessed 
with alleged fraud and abuse by recipients of welfare. This concern was always 
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exaggerated and reflective of deep bias and prejudice against those on assistance. Starting 
in the 1960s, 
Politicians and administrators, especially at the state and local levels, developed 
an obsession with rooting out “fraud” and “abuse” from ADC around this 
time….When Americans looked up in the 1960s, they discovered…..that poverty 
was still there.  But poverty had a very different face from the one it showed 
during the Depression, an increasingly black face...Particularly in the great 
industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, poverty and growing public 
assistance rolls were increasingly concentrated among African-Americans who 
appeared to be benefitting unworthily from the largesse of politicians who could 
manipulate benefits for political gains.36  
 
Lieberman explains that “[t]his newly racialized view of American poverty . . . was far 
from accurate, but the institutional structure of ADC left it exposed to political attacks 
that raised the stock of such views.” And importantly that  
Although the “backlash” against social welfare and civil rights policies is usuallly 
attributed to the the splintering of the civil rights movement, the explosion of 
racial hosility into violence, and the foundering of the Great Society in the middle 
of the decade, race-laden hostility to ADC was already building in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s--a “frontlash” as it were--as an outgrowth of ADC’s structural 
weakness.37 
 
Lieberman devotes significant attention to the welfare reform—“The Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act”— bill signed by Democratic President Bill 
Clinton after passage by the Republican Congress. It is widely seen as a compromise bill 
at the time, but it was punitive: it ended the federal guarantee of subsidy to poor families 
(by imposing a 5-year maximum) and it established work requirements without 
guarantees of jobs or job training, child care and other support services. It also ended 
automatic enrollment into Food Stamps and Medicaid.   
Lieberman asserts without hesitation, “Popular rhetoric and symbolism 
surrounding welfare are overwhelmingly negative, and they rely heavily on racial 
imagery that is sometimes quite explicit.”38 He is clearly frustrated by the inability of the 
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political system that distorts the mission of the welfare system, which is “government 
assistance” to those unable to help themselves.39  Instead, “the popular image of welfare 
is of a program that pays young, unmarried black women in decrepit, violent, drug-
infested neighborhoods to have many children by different men, none of whom they 
marry. Despite being mostly false….The inner cities feeds the barricade mentality of 
white suburbanites, who resent their supposed subsidy of lives they deem pathological.”40  
In a word, Lieberman is giving depiction to the white conception of “underclass” 
a notion popularized by black sociologist William Julius Wilson and demolished by 
political scientist Adolph Reed, Jr.41 The “underclass” was thought to be a segment of the 
poor that remained impoverished because of “values” that put it outside the 
mainstream—laziness, promiscuity, etc.—and not because of structural inequalities 
inherent to capitalism. The extent to which these stereotypes are effectively exploited for 
electoral gain is the focus of Chapter 4. 
Martin Gilens’ title  Why Americans Hate Welfare captures the focus of his 
research question. 42 Gilens shows through quantitative and qualitative methods that  “ 
that stereotypes of black welfare recipients are almost twice as strong in predicting 
opposition to welfare as are the stereotypes of white welfare recipients . . . Despite the 
fact that blacks constitute only 36 percent of all welfare recipients, they clearly dominate 
the American public’s thinking about welfare.”43  
 Further, according to Gilens whites hate “welfare” because they associate it with 
the worst stereotypes of African-Americans: “There exists now a widespread perception 
that welfare has become a ‘code word’ for race. Although this is too simple a 
formulation, I will show that white American’s attitudes toward welfare can only be 
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understood in connection with their beliefs about blacks—especially their judgments 
about the causes of racial inequality and the extent to which blacks’ problems stem from 
their own lack of effort.”44   
Gilens explains that these perspectives are not new: “Negative stereotypes of 
blacks were used in arguing that slavery was necessary to keep blacks in check, or even 
that slavery was in blacks’ own best interest.  Because blacks lacked the intelligence, 
maturity, or industriousness needed to survive in society, some argued, slavery was a 
benefit to both blacks and whites.”45   
 In sum, the scholarship on racial stereotype and criminal justice policy shows 1) 
that stereotypical notions about nonwhites (especially blacks) as criminal and un-
deserving poor led to over-representation of blacks in prison and hostility to public 
subsidy itself in the form of radical public assistance funding cuts; and 2) These public 
policy results, in turn, helps reinforce those stereotypical beliefs. These insights are 
relevant to this study, as the focus of chapter 4 looks at the use of the “Race Card” in 
statewide elections for the governorship in Massachusetts. 
Race and City Politics 
This study draws on keys insights from scholarship on the history of Boston 
politics, and the study of race and urban politics more broadly. Historical studies show 
that Boston politics reflected the class and racial/ethnic cleavages that many major cities 
experienced. The urban politics literature shows a clear relationship between shifting 
racial demographics and partisan voting. 
 Boston’s remote location makes it, perhaps even more so than New York, the 
quintessentially Northeastern city, as its population draws heavily from that region and is 
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not at the crossroads of culture and commerce to the extent that New York is.  As such, 
Boston has a reputation and a history of being sequestered, isolated, and in most respects 
self-sufficient in its raison d’etat, that is, education and cultural innovation. The buttoned-
down, conservative quality of Boston, however, is still very much part of the story of the 
city.46   
In some ways it might seem surprising that racial politics would figure 
prominently in a city like Boston. There was no vast slavery industry to overcome, and 
for much of its history there was not a substantial black population in New England, and 
Boston was no different. It was only after the first wave of black migration that the city 
became home to a large community of African Americans. Then the policies around the 
Federal Housing Administration codified practices of residential segregation that shaped 
city demographics for decades thereafter. According to the Fair Housing Center of 
Greater Boston, regarding the period of 1934-1968, the generation preceding the one 
under study: 
The FHA . . . explicitly practiced a policy of “redlining” when determining which 
neighborhoods to approve mortgages in. Redlining is the practice of denying or limiting 
financial services to certain neighborhoods based on racial or ethnic composition without 
regard to the residents’ qualifications or creditworthiness . . .The FHA allowed personal 
and agency bias in favor of all white suburban subdivisions to affect the kinds of loans it 
guaranteed, as applicants in these subdivisions were generally considered better credit 
risks. 
 In fact, according to James Loewen in his 2006 book Sundown Towns, FHA 
publications implied that different races should not share neighborhoods and repeatedly 
listed neighborhood characteristics like “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” 
alongside such noxious disseminates as “smoke, odors, and fog.”47 
 
It was, however, a combination of the suburbanization of the overall (white) 
population and migration of black residents to the region in the 1950s and 1960s that 
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solidified the social and thus political boundaries that defined the Boston metropolitan 
area: 
Between 1960-1965, a significant migration of African Americans to Boston 
occurred. This influx was happening at a time when urban renewal was focused 
on the rebuilding of Boston’s commercial center, not increasing the supply of 
housing. Housing renewal for the urban work force was accomplished by 
relocation to the suburbs. Industry followed its managerial and technical staff into 
the suburbs, resulting in the white work force fleeing the city, and leaving the city 
of Boston to rely upon commuters rather than a resident work force[…]Such 
shifts in the locations of employment and housing met neither the needs nor the 
skills of the new black residents. By 1970, all of the suburban towns, with the 
exception of Cambridge, were 98% white.48 
 
Thus, it is at least relatively well-established in the literature as well as the political 
discussion of that racial segregation is the modus vivendi of social and political life in 
residential Boston. 
When the long-term effects are considered, it is apparent that federal and financial 
redlining in communities of color concentrates white and black populations in key areas 
of the city for long periods of time. This form of institutional bias creates a path 
dependency that carries long-term effects, such as the perpetuation of this segregation.49  
The consequences of prior policies that crafted residential segregation extend to other 
policy domains, such as employment. As Stephen P. Erie demonstrates in his work 
Rainbow’s End, ethnic divisions and their exploitation by politicos explained Boston 
politics before the central division involved blacks and whites, when it was between the 
ethnic Irish and everyone else.50 As late as the 1950s, “the state Democratic party 
continued to be bitterly divided between a western Yankee and a Boston Irish wing.”51  
Soon, this prior division within the city changed from Yankee and Irish to white and 
nonwhite: 
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Southern blacks came to the northern cities in the largest domestic migration in 
history.  They were soon joined by Hispanics migrating from Puerto Rico, 
Mexico, and Latin America.  The new migrants demanded the machine’s 
traditional benefits--patronage and welfare services.  Without the services of the 
welfare state, the Irish machines lacked the resources to co-opt blacks and 
Hispanics and forestall demands for a greater sharing of the organization’s 
lifeblood--power.52  
 
Indeed, Erie discusses the migration of “4 million whites” leaving cities and “5 million 
blacks” migrating north.53 This virtually redrew the racial and ethnic maps of cities 
within a generation, between 1940 and 1980. It is in this time period that Boston political 
elites attempt to build a political “machine” and inadvertently ended up with a higher cost 
for the urban welfare state per capita than any other city in the country. 54  
If the racial inequalities between whites and nonwhites were ever latent, the 
numerous social policies of the 1960s and early 1970s made them manifest. Ronald 
Formisiano in Boston Against Busing (2004) demonstrates the enormous impact the 
federal decision to mandate school integration had on Boston. Indeed, the history of 
school busing in the 1970s is a chilling reminder of the city’s drastic residential and 
social segregation. 
Formisano’s narrative is an attempt to weave together the history of a socio-
political phenomenon that saw perhaps the largest-scale attempt to socially integrate 
black and white America into one community in American history. Boston seemed to be 
the most likely to achieve peaceful success as the home of the Kennedys and the long 
history of immigration.  Instead, however, South Boston gained a reputation as the 
epitome of an antiblack working-class enclave, that employed the tactics of the southern 
segregationists when defending its “turf.”  It then came as no surprise when George 
Wallace and Scoop Jackson, two antibusing candidates for the Democratic presidential 
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nomination, won a combined 80 percent of the vote in South Boston during the 1976 
Massachusetts Democratic primary. 
The city was at the time home to the largest black population in all of the New 
England region, in a city that is the engine, the heart, and the epitome of majority-white, 
blue-collar and white-collar America. Busing represented a sympolic and tangible 
example of federal intervention that upturned the cart of white privilege. This is precisely 
why the reaction was so fierce. Formisiano explains the entire phenomenon in his 
conclusion: 
Many white northerners, especially blue-collar workers, urban ethnics, Catholics, 
and union members, who had been Democratic stalwarts, felt threatened in the 
1960s by a broad array of social and cultural changes.  Many came to see gains 
for blacks and other minorities as somehow a diminution of their status and rights.  
The white backlash thrived on a sense of politics as a zero-sum game in which the 
redressing of wrongs for blacks came to be perceived as a loss for those whites 
most socially and geographically proximate to blacks. These fearful whites began 
to respond to the appeals of conservative politicians who argued that the civil 
rights revolution had gone far enough and who presented themselves as 
champions of stability and traditional values.55  
 
The aforementioned works give accounts of the relevant history of Boston that 
precedes the period of this study. A different subset of scholarly works in urban studies, 
more quantitative in methodology, has also produced relevant insight. 
For example, in a work that bridges the gaps between urban studies and 
conventional quantitative political science, Richard M. Sauerzopf and Todd Swanstrom 
published an article in Urban Affairs Review in 1999 entitled, “The Urban Electorate in 
Presidential Elections, 1928-1996.”56 Sauerzopf and Swanstrom have studied what were 
the twelve largest cities in the United States back to 1928, and tracked their electoral 
developments. They have found that cities have diverged from the national pattern in this 
way: they are both more important to Democrats “and more volatile than the 
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conventional wisdom suggests.”  They suggests costs to the Democrats’ suburban 
strategy, in the form of “declining turnout among potential Democratic voters in the 
cities.”57 Sauerzopf and Swanstrom note, “As cities have increasingly deviated from 
national voting trends, however, their turnout rates have increasingly fallen behind the 
national rates.” They issued a call for researchers to break down the suburban vote and to 
examine contextual effects on voting behavior.58  
This division of urban and suburban votes is of political significance because, as 
Sauerzopf and Swanstrom mention as a marker of the consensus in the field, “The 
Democratic Party relied heavily on urban votes to build the New Deal coalition that 
dominated national elections from the 1930s to the 1960s.  Similarly, the migration 
outward from cities to suburbs, which accelerated in the 1950s, fueled the rise to power 
of the Republican Party in national elections beginning in 1968 and signaled the 
progressive marginalization of urban electorates in national elections.”59  
Citywide vote totals and voter registration are both necessary, but not sufficient to 
capture this effect.  Thanks to a thorough study of city election voting returns, such data 
is now readily available for Boston, and so are the neighborhood returns for Boston.  A 
close study of the city of Boston itself is valuable, as Sauerzopf and Swanstrom can 
attest: “Even though the conventional account, described earlier, of the rise and decline of 
the urban electorate is widely accepted, there is relatively little published analysis of city 
voting trends overtime to back it up. The main reason is that voting statistics in the 
United States are reported by county, not by city.  Unless the city boundaries correspond 
to county boundaries, city election returns are not widely available.  Before 1950, county 
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voting returns corresponded closely to city returns, but with massive suburbanization 
over time, county returns have increasingly deviated from city returns.”60  
There are few areas in cities that are truly and in a stable way diverse.  A 
neighborhood is either moving toward being a black neighborhood, toward becoming a 
white neighborhood, toward becoming a Latino neighborhood, or remaining as one of the 
former. This segregation can be institutional, but whatever the cause, the effect becomes 
political and indeed shapes the politics of the day. Just what shape that politics takes is 
the focus of this work and is the focus of much of the urban voting literature as of late. 
Zoltan Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine have, for example, in “What Underlies 
Urban Politics? Race, Class, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Urban Vote” found that race 
is the “dominant factor” in urban elections.61 Through a study of the mayoral elections of 
the twenty most populous cities in the United States over the past several decades and 
accompanying survey data, Hajnal and Trounstine constructed a pattern of support for 
major candidates in these powerful and visible urban elections.  Race, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, played the major role, even above class and gender, even in nonpartisan 
urban elections. 
This is even true of “liberal” cities: “More liberal cities were just as racially 
divided as less liberal cities.  Furthermore, in alternate tests, when we substituted in a 
proxy for racial tolerance--the percentage of residents with a college degree—we found 
no additional link to the vote.”62 Their findings, thoroughly grounded in empirical data, 
are nothing short of stunning in their simplicity and in their implications for the wider 
American electorate: 
Latinos, whites, and African-Americans are all more apt to vote as a bloc.  This 
within-group cohesion persists when the candidates in the election are all from the 
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same race . . . Cohesion in these single race elections is 69.4% for blacks, 67.5% 
for whites, 61.5% for Latinos, and 63.1% for Asian-Americans.  Overall, these 
results suggest that race is fairly ubiquitous in the urban arena.  America’s four 
main racial and ethnic groups do represent somewhat cohesive communities.  
Mayoral voting is at least in part the story of four different racial and ethnic 
groups sorting out their differences.63 
 
By focusing on the urban electorate, Hajnal and Trounstine are making a 
statement about American politics in general. The overwhelming majority of each 
particular ethnic group gravitates toward the candidate who represents their collective 
interest. The division is even starker, by the way, in campaigns wherein the actual 
candidates came from two different races or ethnic groups.  The contrast is smaller with 
white candidates. If, however, a black candidate were to face a white candidate, the 
polarization becomes more pronounced. How then can American politics ever be 
anything but a sophisticated negotiation between racial and ethnic groups? Their 
conclusion is challenging to students of politics of the United States: 
Most accounts of politics at the local or national level point to party identification 
or ideology as the main driving forces in American politics (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Green et al. 2002, Miller and Shanks 1996). But the results presented here suggest 
otherwise.  Party identification certainly matters. And the ideology greatly helps 
to predict vote choice.  But in local democracy, it is race more than anything else 
that tends to dominate voter decision making.64  
 
Jereon van der Waal, Willem de Koster, and Peter Achterberg, have written an 
extremely interesting piece that has potentially wide-ranging significance in analyzing the 
racial politics of cities.  In  “Ethnic Segregation and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Dutch 
Cities” the abstract reads: 
Our analyses on 50 Dutch cities demonstrate that ethnic segregation leads to PVV 
[right-wing] voting, and that this positive effect is stronger in cities with a more 
tolerant cultural atmosphere and lower levels of unemployment. This positive 
effect is at odds with ethnic threat theory, and our contextualization informed by 
the cultural and economic conditions of cities enables distinguishing between 
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contact theory and concentration theory.  Whereas both predict a positive effect, 
only contact theory is corroborated by our results.65   
 
Van der Waal et al. have here made a serious attempt to contribute to the widely 
held, historically important view in political science that the “ethnic threat” theory is one 
that holds the most explanatory power.  Van der Waal et al. cite both the work of V.O. 
Key, Mendelberg and Kinder, and other who hold an implied version of the ethnic threat 
theory as central to their working models: whites who face blacks in a large-scale 
confrontation are those most likely to vote against the best interests of blacks.66   
Van der Waal et al. test this theory by using the PVV, a right-wing, anti-
immigrant party, as the dependent variable, and in searching for the independent variable, 
sees those sectors most likely to vote for the PVV in highly segregated native (Dutch) 
neighborhoods in more cosmopolitan, liberal cities.   
Conclusion 
The aforementioned studies from a range of subfields in political science and 
political sociology offer important insights for the present study. Here again are some of 
the key points: 
1. Race is central to American political development. A large body of scholarship traces 
the evolution of political institutions and social policy. Race, class and other forms of 
ascriptive status have shaped elite conceptions of citizenship status.  It should not 
be surprising that appeals to racial stereotypes would be effective in electoral 
campaigns. 
2. A significant body of survey and experimental research has demonstrated this 
centrality. Implicit appeals to anti-black and anti-brown sentiment win white votes 
and support. 
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3. Racist stereotypes have created disparities in poverty and incarceration, and these 
facts inter reinforce popular perceptions. Support for more prisons and tougher 
sentencing on one hand, and more restrictive welfare subsidies on the other, are the 
direct result of these racial biases. 
4. Urban political history and contemporary studies underscore the importance of 
residential segregation over time and the continuing salience of race in city elections. 
Moreover, as turnout has declined in cities, candidates for office have looked for 
ways to secure suburban (more white and affluent) voters and to distance urban ones. 
These four general insights are relevant to the study. Boston prides itself on its 
cosmopolitanism, but it has been and remains a segregated city, which its politics reflect. 
White reaction to policy and protest of the 1960s shaped voting patterns in subsequent 
decades.  
This study looks principally at neighborhoods in Boston, but also gives attention 
to the Greater Boston area.  In many respects, it heeds Sauerzopf and Swanstrom’s call. 
Chapter 3 examines  population shifts and corresponding enrollment and voting change 
over time.  Like Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, the data is limited insofar as it will show how 
the electorate voted at the level of the neigborhood. Thus voting patterns “could be the 
result of the characteristics of individual voters who live in cities (e.g., their race or 
class), or voting behavior could be due to a ‘contextual effect’ of living within central-
city municipal boundaries.”67  
Unlike Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, this study will look at the sorts of campaign 
rhetoric that appealed to a sort of “siege” mentality for neighborhoods that were the 
center of racial division in the 1970s (and indeed in those suburbs to which those whites 
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fled).  As will be shown in chapter 4, “resistance” can take the form of opposition not just 
to formal and explicit racial integration, but to governmental policies that benefit the out-
group. Nowhere is this resistance more in evidence than in South Boston during the 
busing crisis or in (popular) exhortations by Massachusetts politicians to get people “off 
the welfare rolls” or “in prison where they belong” during a period of economic hardship. 
Finally, it will also become apparent that coded political appeals are the rhetorical 
weapon of choice rather than explicitly racial calls to arms, and those codes have served 
the political actors well who have employed them. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RACIAL AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN BOSTON’S NEIGHBORHOODS 
Introduction 
 At midcentury, Boston faced similar challenges that urban municipalities across 
the country confronted: a declining industrial base, inadequate housing and social 
services, segregated schools: and city and state officials responded in ways common to 
that era. Federal programs like “urban renewal,” the War on Poverty, and an ambitious 
desegregation policy transformed the social, economic and political landscape.1 The 
contested terrain of city politics was the context in which neighborhoods changed in 
terms of demographics and ultimately politics. White opposition took the form of “flight” 
and change in partisan affiliation from Democratic to Republican in many urban 
neighborhoods and suburban municipalities. Central cities, like Boston, became more 
Democratic. 
These social trends coincided with partisan trends, which manifest in partisan 
identification, as well as statewide elections. Local elections in Boston are nonpartisan 
affairs, and thus do not lend themselves to unbiased inquiry.  However, insight from 
urban areas is of particular interest because it sees a much more diverse racial makeup 
than the rest of the state, and the racial makeups of the respective neighborhoods tend to 
gravitate heavily toward the dominance of either white, black, Hispanic, or Asian 
majorities.   
This chapter examines the demographic and partisan changes in Boston’s 
neighborhoods for the period of this study. It first lays out the historical context that 
shaped city politics in the postwar era. It then gives an overview of the sixteen planning 
  44  
 
districts that will be referred to as “neighborhoods” in these pages. Examination of the 
demographic, enrollment and voting data is clear: the Republican Party relies on votes 
from predominantly white and suburban areas of the city and in specific neighborhoods 
of the city. Combined, these sections of Greater Boston formed part of the winning 
strategy the Republican party used to successfully elect William Weld in 1990 and 1994, 
Paul Cellucci in 1998, and Mitt Romney in 2002. Chapter 4 will subsequently show that 
these trends coinceded with the strategies and efforts of the Republican party at the state 
level and to employ racially implicit messaging, or “racial conservatism”  as a way to 
appeal to white urban (and suburban) constituencies.  
Historical Overview 
Boston underwent major political, social, and economic changes over the last half 
century. Mollenkopf gave an account of these in his The Contested City (1983). After 
World War II, the city experienced a period of economic expansion coupled with 
suburban resettlement. As Judd explains in City Politics (2009), highway development 
coupled with government incentives for homebuilding and mortgage loans made the 
suburbs a newly attractive area for postwar life. It was not simply that urban life had 
changed; it was that a new alternative existed. Simultaneously, black migration from the 
southern states was perhaps the greatest movement of labor within national boundaries 
within world history.  Black workers were met with redlining, subpar housing, and 
welfare programs, all of which reinforced of the idea of a less than desirable urban 
investment environment.   
Government soon attempted to intervene to revitalize urban centers, still the 
location of most workplaces and (declining, but still signficant and substantial) votes. 
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Initiated under Mayor John Hynes, urban renewal was a federally-subsidized government 
policy that sought to increase property values in poor neighborhoods by granting 
financial incentives to commercial developers in those neighborhoods. Boston was one of 
a number of cities affected by this initiative.2  City politics were also impacted by 
President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society Programs.  The 
expansion of public housing, government-financed health care, food stamps, and 
temporary assistance in the form of welfare benefits were all launched within the same 
brief political era when urban flight had been the reality for over twenty years.3 
Key to this study from the perspective of race and partisanship was a 
desegregation plan launched in Boston public schools in 1974. In that year federal Judge 
Arthur Garrity sought to fully implement Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
Kansas by way of a federal takeover of Boston’s school system. Students were bused 
from black neighborhoods (Roxbury, Mattapan) to white neighborhoods (South Boston, 
Charlestown), and vice versa, in order to achieve this goal. Chaos ensued. Riots were 
provoked by the rhetoric and posture of militant white opponents who stood in front of 
high schools. These militant white opponents to desgregation via busing directed violence 
against students and the buses in which they came. National media attention became 
fixed on the problem as a signal of “white backlash” against the black-white integration 
that was the hallmark dream of the Civil Rights Movement.  The opposition to busing and 
desegration, rooted in the white, Irish, and working class section of South Boston cannot 
be overemphasized. This conflict was symbolic of the political tensions, protest 
movements, federal policies and court decisions unleashed at the time. Moreover, protest 
movements (organized and more inchoate riots and disruptions) and federal intervention 
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for civil and economic rights can be seen as a “critical juncture” in the language of 
APD—white resentment could thereafter be mobilized in new and different ways.  
How this occurred in Boston is clear from an exploration of the sixteen “planning 
districts” in the city of Boston over the period of this study. These planning districts, 
categorized by the Boston Redevelopment Authority,4 are roughly equivalent to the idea 
of “neighborhoods” in other major cities. The Republican Party’s success in gubernatorial 
election owes itself to its ability to secure the votes of key neighborhoods within the city. 
An examination of Boston’s neighborhoods, their historical makeup, and political 
affiliations over time, show how and why this is so.  
The Neighborhoods: A Study in Transition, Evolution, and Politics 
Yankee Boston: The Back Bay/Beacon Hill and Fenway Neighborhoods 
Officially, the Boston Redevelopment Authority designates the Back Bay/Beacon 
Hill neighborhood as one planning district, but they consider themselves distinct 
neighborhoods.  The Back Bay is the larger neighborhood, but Beacon Hill is the most 
prominent.  It is home to some of the priciest real estate in the city. Notable American 
politician John Kerry makes his home on Beacon Hill, in a multimillion dollar 
townhouse.  Beacon Hill is also home to the Massachusetts State House and its golden 
dome, one of the few statehouses in the United States with such notoriety.  It is the hill to 
which John Winthrop originally referred when making his “Shining City Upon a Hill” 
speech with biblical overtones.  It is also home to much of the “Freedom Trail” in the 
city, a tourist attraction led by expert historians in period attire. 
Businesspeople and professionals also call Beacon Hill home, though there is 
affordable housing for middle-income residents, as well. As of 2000, nearly 90% of the 
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residents of the neighborhood were white, and high in the Fenway, as well.  The Fenway 
is the location of legendary Fenway Park, home of the Boston Red Sox and symbolically 
the epicenter of Bostonian urban life. Interestingly, this is a neighborhood that has 
undergone perhaps the least significant demographic change, and yet it is decidedly 
experiencing a partisan shift. Yankee Boston used to provide a base for statewide 
Republicans, from Governor Francis Sargent and Senator Edward Brooke in the 1970s to 
Governor William Weld in the 1990s.  Since 2000, however, not one precinct in these 
neighborhoods has voted for a Republican in a statewide election.  This does not, of 
course, foreclose the possibility in the future, but it is notable that Republicans are no 
longer drawing their primary urban votes from the wealthiest neighborhoods in the city, 
but rather those neigborhoods which have undergone severe conflict and strife which has 
racial implications. Republican enrollment in the Back Bay has slightly declined, notably 
in the 1970s and early 2000s, while Democratic enrollment increased slightly only in the 
1970s.5  The Fenway saw some white decrease in its population in both the 70s and 80s, 
and with it, some decline in Republican enrollment. Asian and Latino movement into 
both neighborhoods increased over the entire era, but especially in the early 2000s.  
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Table 3.1 Back Bay/Beacon Hill 
Back Bay/Beacon Hill 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 2719 2081 2794 3931 
Democratic 
Enrollment 3764 4859 5665 6020 
White % 0.95 0.9 0.9 0.89 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
Table 3.2 Fenway/Kenmore 
Fenway/Kenmore 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  Enrollment 1429 816 891 1173 
Democratic Enrollment 2530 2015 3014 3858 
White % .87 .80 .72 .69 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
The South End 
The South End has long been an area that is supposed to be Boston’s case study in 
urban renewal and “gentrification.”  And, as Thomas H. O’Connor explains, that 
gentrification has had an impact on the larger Boston sphere, making what was once a 
majority-minority neighborhood in 1970 majority white by 2000. The process began in 
1954:  
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When the Hynes administration demolished the New York Streets section of the 
South End back . . . displaced tenants were forced to look for other places to live.  
Most white families went into housing projects in South Boston, Dorchester, and 
Jamaica Plain; African-American and Puerto Rican families moved to 
Washington Park and North Dorchester.  A number of these black families 
moved across into northern Mattapan, a neighborhood considered to be the 
largest Jewish community in New England.6  
 
 Mollenkopf also emphasized the South End as a case study in urban renewal. 
Mollenkopf writes:  
Boston’s South End redevelopment area, rated at $37 million in public money, 
ranks among the top three residential projects and has also displaced thousands of 
people….In Boston, renewal in the South End was designed to produce 
“maximum upgrading,” to use Edward Logue’s words, in a housing stock 
adjacent to the [Central Business District], a hospital complex, and the newer 
office developments in the Back Bay.  Other large Boston renewal projects 
cleared land near Massachusetts General Hospital, for a new Government Center 
office complex, and for the Prudential Life Insurance Company.7  
 
From the beginning, the South End was a concentrated effort to expand the central 
business district that had the consequence of transforming the demographic makeup of 
the neighborhood. This took massive institutional intervention, however; and again these 
development efforts seem to explain the counter-trend of white influx as opposed to flight 
since the South End saw an overall 50% increase in the white population from 1970 to 
2000.8  During this time Republican enrollment increased a total of over 60%.9  The 
black population, meanwhile, declined by over 33% and Democratic enrollments fell. 
The South End is now a choice neighborhood marked by high real estate prices. It is 
geographically closest to both the Back Bay and Beacon Hill areas, where the capital 
buildings sit and the wealthy historically and presently reside. As early as the 1980s, 
residents of surrounding areas began accusing South End and Back Bay residents of wish 
to create a “silk-stocking district” similar to the Upper East Side of Manhattan.10  The 
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South End is an example of the counter-trend that is thought to be occurring now in cities 
across the United State whereby the white middle class is returning to central cities and 
providing support for the Democratic party.   
Table 3.3 South End 
South End 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 957 742 1168 1692 
Democratic 
Enrollment 3692 4065 5625 6781 
White % .40 .35 .40 .45 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
Central Boston: North End, the West End, and Chinatown 
 
The West End saga is, like that of the South End, a story best told comprhensively 
in Mollenkopf’s work, The Contested City.  The upshot, however, is that the formerly 
sprawling neighborhood known as the West End in Boston is today no more than an 
afterthought of a few hundred residences in metropolitan Boston. It covers one precinct in 
Central Boston.11 
The North End, however, is the oldest continuous settlement in North America.  It 
was for a time “Boston proper”, and is adjacent to Beacon Hill and Fanuil Hall, the 
much-vaunted and tourist-ridden Quincy Market. It is home to the Old North Church, a 
site of heritage from the American Revolution, where the Bicentennial with President 
Gerald Ford and Queen Elizabeth II was celebrated in 1976. It is also Boston’s Little 
  51  
 
Italy.  According to Steven Puleo in his recent work, The Boston Italians: “Even as late as 
1980, the North End’s population was about 60 percent Italian American (the figure is 
under 40 percent today), and it retained its character, reputation, and heritage as one of 
the nation’s best-known Italian neighborhoods.”12  
Italian-Americans in New England, from Saugus to Pittsfield, Massachusetts see 
the North End as the Old Neighborhood.  Whites, including a plurality of Italian-
American whites, make up the majority in the North End, and it has experienced 
revitalization thanks to an even more involved urban development project, the Central 
Artery or Big Dig project.  The Big Dig was essentially supposed to bury a stretch of 
elevated highway under the North End underground instead.  The major component was 
to remove the highway in order to encourage pedestrian traffic and ease auto traffic, and 
it seems to have been largely successful in those goals. The North End is also one of the 
friendliest enclaves in the city to Republican candidates for governor in the last four 
decades. It is worth noting that the Italian population, until the 1970s, had been 
historically a largely Democratic constituency, but that began to change in the post-1960s 
era. This neighborhood threw its support overwhelmingly to Republican candidate, and 
Italian-American, Paul Cellucci. 
The change of the percentage of Asian residents in the various neighborhoods is 
associated with most neighborhoods in Boston.  In no neighborhood do they constitute a 
majority.  However, in Chinatown, which is no more than a few precincts within Central 
Boston, Asian residents comprise roughly 60% of the population (which itself is roughly 
5,000 whereas most neighborhoods average 30,000), which is not a major change over 
the past several decades.  
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Overall Central Boston has seen a 60% population increase over the last four 
decades, owing to a large influx of minority residents, while its white population has also 
slightly increased. Its Democratic enrollment has fallen slightly, as well, notably in the 
1990s, the same time of Republican resurgence, possibly indicating a permanent shift of 
allegiance in the rightward direction. 
Table 3.4 Central Boston 
Central 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 708 1088 1718 2989 
Democratic 
Enrollment 6154 6928 7021 7614 
White % .89 .79 .74 .70 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
The Second Ward: Charlestown 
Historical site of the revolutionary battle site of Bunker Hill, Charlestown is now 
and has been the home to a working-class mix of residents of Irish and Italian ancestry 
that has seen some Latino settlement in the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Home 
to the Charlestown Navy Yard, a historical place of employment but now a testament to 
the endless experimentation in the spirit of urban renewal, Charlestown is geographically 
isolated from the rest of the city, not the least of which because it is bounded by the 
Charles and Mystic Rivers, making it one of the more notable peninsulas in the region. It 
has also been the site of continuous efforts at renewal by the Boston Redevelopment 
Authority, which remains a large landowner within the neighborhood. Perhaps no one 
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description of the neighborhood is more apt than Ronald Formisiano’s in Boston Against 
Busing:  
Treated partly as a dumping-ground for institutions unwanted elsewhere, 
Charlestown had been closed in by ugly steel and concrete bridges and highways 
built mainly for the convenience of others, and a noisy, elevated railway had been 
thrust through its heart.  In the 1930s bulldozers made way for a large housing 
project, over the screams of many of those displaced, and by the 1960s the project 
had deteriorated into a cauldron of social disorganization.  In the 1970s it would 
provide militant antibusing leaders and many young street 
warriors….Charlestown qualified perhaps even more as an urban village, with 
fifteen to seventeen thousand persons packed into one square mile of a hilly 
peninsula. Over the years Italians and others had moved in and intermarried with 
the predominant Irish Catholics, so that everybody was related to everybody else. 
Thus loyalty to “Our Town” transcended anything necessarily Irish or 
Catholic….13   
 
In Charlestown itself, which is slightly smaller than the others (about 15,000 
residents), an interesting phenomenon can be observed.  The white population dropped by 
roughly 2,000, and the combined black, Latino, and Asian populations increased by 
roughly 3,000, but the Republican enrollment increased from 100 to 1,400. This does not 
appear to be superficial enrollment, either.  There is a definite uptick in Republican 
strength in voting support for mayor, governor, and president from 1964 to 2008 in 
Charlestown.  
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Table 3.5 Charlestown 
Charlestown 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 177 286 752 1625 
Democratic 
Enrollment 6279 5673 5788 5416 
White % .98 .98 .95 .79 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
 
East Boston: A New Latino-Majority Community 
 
East Boston is formerly home to the working-class district of Italian-Americanism 
and has evolved into the only majority-Latino neighborhood in the city, at 53% of its 
residents as of 2010.  Like every neighborhood with majority-white students experiencing 
integrated school busing, East Boston was the site of political and social conflict.  East 
Boston, for most of the twentieth century, was an outpost of Italian-American culture that 
rivaled the North End, but was home certainly to more working-class residents. It too was 
the site of antibusing riots simply because it was at the center of the controversy; and, at 
roughly the same time, the new Logan International Airport expansion was undertaken 
over residents’ objections. 
East Boston subsequently became home to thousands of Latino immigrants, 
beginning in the 1980s, when over 5,000 new Latino residents found new homes in the 
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neighborhood. In the 1990s and 2000s, 10,000 and 7,000 new residents moved in, 
respectively, to the point now where East Boston is majority Latino, a majority with 
Mexican ancestry. There are some Salvadoran and Puerto Rican communities, as well, 
but East Boston is socially and politically a Latino-majority community, and that 
community is predominantly Mexican or Mexican-American.  Before and during the 
transition, East Boston was a reliably or at least reasonably Republican stronghold, but 
now that status is relegated to some of the outer precincts, which still hold a large non-
Hispanic white majority (and perhaps Italian ancestry, although that precise data is 
unavailable).  East Boston saw its Latino population rise from 600 to 21,000, but again, 
its Republican enrollment shifted by only 400. Formerly friendly to Republican 
candidates for governor, it has experienced low turnout in recent years and usually 
provided proof that the Latino electorate in Massachusetts is solidly in the Democratic 
column. 
Table 3.6 East Boston 
East Boston 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 694 601 736 1089 
Democratic 
Enrollment 17834 15295 13872 15111 
White % .97 .97 .76 .51 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
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South Boston 
“Southie” is perhaps the epitome of the popular perception of Boston as the 
working-class Irish urban ghetto and is still home to some Irish settlement.  It was at the 
epicenter of the Boston Busing controversy.  Irish Catholics form at least the plurality, if 
not the majority, of South Boston residents, and the neighborhood has the smallest 
nonwhite population in Boston.  It was, not unfairly, the neighborhood that symbolizes 
one of the most visible racial conflicts in the post-civil rights era.  The culture and the 
politics have informed each other in familiar and unfortunate ways—giving it a unique 
political and socioeconomic profile. 
Indeed, while South Boston has undergone some wealthy investment and hence 
gentrification, it is surprisingly still home to a largely white, working-class population, so 
much so that less than 5% of the population is black14. Politically, South Boston has 
formed the cornerstone or base for one of the two major candidates for mayor in virtually 
every election since 1967, as much as it has for Republican candidates for governor or 
president during that era.   It is the largest, most reliable Republican bastion, even voting 
for Reagan in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections and providing precinct victories 
for Republican candidates through 2002, the only exception being the vote for 
conservative Silber in 1990.  Along with Charlestown, the white population has remained 
stable, but a combination of high Democratic disenrollment and significant Republican 
enrollment increase has made for a more fertile environment for Republican competition. 
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Table 3.7 South Boston 
South Boston 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 654 1295 1274 1893 
Democratic 
Enrollment 18419 13780 13028 12687 
White % .97 .98 .95 .85 
  
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
West Roxbury: Suburb of Dedham 
As a “streetcar suburb” West Roxbury has long had a conflicting identity both 
within and outside the city of Boston.  It has a Protestant past, but is now home largely to 
the white ethnic (Irish) as well as Jewish community, and over the past twenty years, has 
also seen a significant Latino and Asian residential movement.15 
 West Roxbury is and has been for over half a century, a largely white, Catholic 
community adjacent to the wealthy suburb of Dedham, and in many respects it is visually 
and architecturally indistinguishable.  Administratively, however, both Dedham and West 
Roxbury are served by the Dedham and Boston City school districts, respectively, and are 
accountable to different municipal governments.   
West Roxbury has historically been a majority-non-Hispanic white neighborhood 
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that has often acted as part of the base of any successful Republican candidate in Boston. 
It is nearly as reliable in both respects as South Boston. Residents of West Roxbury could 
be counted on to provide majorities for Reagan, Weld, and Cellucci, and when the 
neighborhood began to experience some demographic change, there were still precincts 
within the neighborhood that turned out for Romney in 2002.  West Roxbury, perhaps 
more than any neighborhood, is still culturally and even politically suburban in 
character16. West Roxbury saw the greatest degree of Democratic decline as a proportion 
of the neighborhood’s electorate. Its Republican base is still relatively stable, despite the 
movement of new minority residents. 
Table 3.8 West Roxbury 
West Roxbury 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 1985 1712 1597 3359 
Democratic 
Enrollment 14434 13871 11830 10729 
White % 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.84 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
Ward 18 Neighbors: Hyde Park and Mattapan 
Like West Roxbury, Hyde Park has a largely Yankee Protestant past, but like 
many neighborhoods bordering Roxbury, it has seen a transformation from white 
majority to black plurality over the past four decades.  
In the adjoining neighborhoods of Hyde Park and Mattapan, the process has been 
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a slow but steady one, in which black residents have begun to form a majority, first in 
Mattapan, and now certainly in Hyde Park.  White residents have moved out in droves, as 
many as ten thousand per decade in these neighborhoods, each with roughly thirty 
thousand residents.   
As O’Connor notes about Mattapan:  
 
Between 1968 and 1970, some three thousand African-American 
families entered Mattapan, moving along Blue Hill Avenue from 
Grove Hall toward Mattapan Square. By 1972, the number of 
Jewish residents in the area had dropped to fewer than twenty-five 
hundred, and the subsequent flare-up of racial fears, panic selling, 
and blockbusting accelerated the exodus of Jewish families to the 
point where a once predominantly Jewish community was 
transformed into an almost all-black neighborhood. (O’Connor, 
241) 
 
For Hyde Park, the neighborhood is perhaps one of the best test cases for the 
linkage between political and demographic change, as it was on the “frontier” of the 
busing crisis. Many wealthy parents sent their children to private school to avoid the 
desgregation effort17: 
Hyde Park saw its black population increase from 100 to 15,000 (again, out of a 
population of 30,000) and a concomitant white decrease, and thus did Hyde Park begin to 
undergo a racial transformation.  Hyde Park saw its proportion of black residents steadily 
increase from 7 percent in 1980 to 41 percent in 2000, with over 12,000 black residents in 
the 30,000 resident neighborhood. Meanwhile, white residents constituted over 95 
percent of the neighborhood in 1970, when the population numbered almost 40,000, 
while in 2000 the white population was 13,00018. 
Mattapan more quickly became a black-majority neighborhood although by 1970 
there was already a substantial black population that was still in the minority.  During the 
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ensuing decade, 20,000 white residents moved out of the neighborhood, and 10,000 black 
residents moved in.  Since that time, the neighborhood has maintained roughly an 80% 
black population, while the non-Hispanic white population has shrunk to below 5% as of 
2000.  Hyde Park and Mattapan, adjacent to one another, now together occupy most of 
Ward 18 in Boston, which is fully now a black majority ward, but was majority white in 
197019. 
Despite the large number of new black residents, Hyde Park had seen three 
decades of declining Democratic enrollment in the 1970s through the 1990s. It was not 
until the 2000s that Hyde Park began to see an uptick in Democratic enrollment. 
Mattapan, has actually seen its Democratic enrollment decline overall, particularly in the 
1990s. 
Table 3.9 Hyde Park 
Hyde Park 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 1205 1080 1015 1192 
Democratic 
Enrollment 13518 10746 9039 9310 
White % .99 .85 .72 .43 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, City of Boston and U.S. Census Reports from the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority. 
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Table 3.10 Mattapan 
Mattapan 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 890 759 277 490 
Democratic 
Enrollment 10675 4707 6013 8159 
White % .55 .15 .08 .04 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
Roxbury 
Roxbury has always been the heart of Boston’s black population. It grew simply 
because of redlining in the early part of the 20th Century (see chapter 2), and by 1970, it 
was home to a majority of the black population in Boston, which in absolute terms is the 
largest concentration of black people in Massachusetts.  
Roxbury in the 1970s was at the heart of what the Boston Globe in the 1970s 
called “the black wards” as an indicator, perhaps, but decidedly an unfortunate choice of 
words.  The proportion of black residents has declined significantly in the last forty years, 
from three-quarters of the nearly 70,000 residents in 1970 to just a bare majority of 
56,000 residents in 2000, a net decline of nearly 20,000 black residents— a drop of over 
forty percent, in thirty years.  The movement of the black population is not unlike the 
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movement of other ethnic populations, but is perhaps more visible and more thoroughly 
catalogued.  William E. Nelson also notes in his case study of Boston and Liverpool20 
that while Roxbury has been the site of numerous radical protests over the years—such as 
the 1967 welfare mothers sit-in that ultimately gained them positive attention from a 
Republican governor—it is not a neighborhood where organized political activity has 
been consistent, say, for example, in terms of voter mobilization.21   Subsequently, the 
racial composition began to markedly shift:  
In Boston, the continued movement southward of the Black 
population has resulted in the concentration of Black residents in 
Roxbury and Mattapan.  Blacks constituted the overwhelming 
majority of residents in bot of these communities in 1990, 72 
percent in Roxbury, and 82 percent in Mattapan…Boston’s racial 
composition is changing at a rapid clip.  The predominant trend is 
the decline of the White population and the remarkable growth of 
Black and immigrant populations.  Between 1950 and 1980, 
Boston’s White population declined from 95 percent to 70 percent; 
across these same years, the Black and minority population climed 
from 5 percent to 30 percent.22 
 
Roxbury is the only neighborhood that saw a significant increase in Democratic  
 
enrollment as a proportion of registered voters.  The Latino movement into Roxbury  
 
almost directly supplements the black exodus, with nearly 15,000 new Latino residents  
 
since 1970. 
Table 3.11 Roxbury 
Roxbury 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  Enrollment 1190 1142 327 402 
Democratic Enrollment 13820 9401 13634 17240 
White % .18 .08 .06 .05 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
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Dorchester: North and South 
The neighborhood of Dorchester, comprising the planning districts of North 
Dorchester and South Dorchester, reflects perhaps the greatest degree of diversity in the 
city.  This is partly due to its size, as together it is certainly the largest neighborhood in 
the city of Boston in terms of population, at roughly 100,000 residents out of 600,000 in 
the city.  It has been thus since its absorption by the city of Boston over a century ago. 
 Dorchester was a working-class outskirt of the city of Boston until the Great Migration, 
and the turn-of-the century saw a decidedly Irish white majority in the neighborhood, 
both north and south.  Students were bused into Dorchester as well, and, at the start of the 
1970s, it was decidedly a white-majority neighborhood. There has been no particular 
growth or seismic political change in Dorchester during this time, only that it was the site 
of much of Roxbury’s black out-migration and the settling point for much of what has 
become Boston’s increasingly foreign-born population.  North Dorchester has gone from 
just over 80% non-Hispanic white to about 45% non-Hispanic white in the 1970-2000 
era, and South Dorchester has seen its black population increase from only one-tenth to a 
plurality of the neighborhood, at just over 40%, in 2010.  Yet South Dorchester has 
retained its 1500 (give or take a few) enrolled Republicans during that entire period, 
fluctuating a bit but remaining at that level.   
North Dorchester has actually increased its number of enrolled Republicans from 
700 to about 900.  Yet, to note actual Republican political strength in North Dorchester in 
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regular elections is perhaps more accurate of a picture, rather than just depicting random 
Republican presence that constitutes 1% of the population.  As the white population is 
now just over one-third what it once was (under 10,000 rather than over 27,000), so is the 
average Republican vote roughly one-third of what it was in the early 1970s (1500 rather 
than 5,000).  
South Dorchester, similarly, has seen its Republican strength in gubernatorial 
elections decline from over 10,000 in the late 1960s and early 1970s to an average of 
perhaps 4,000 in the last two decades, while its white population has seen a drop of 
nearly half, as well. It would appear that in this neighborhood, if both are counted 
together as one neighborhood, that there is a relationship between the waning of 
Republican strength and white flight.  
Table 3.12 North Dorchester 
North Dorchester 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 669 590 547 879 
Democratic 
Enrollment 13428 7453 6559 7494 
White % .83 .67 .53 .36 
 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
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Table 3.13 South Dorchester 
South Dorchester 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 1567 1292 1124 1600 
Democratic 
Enrollment 22900 16486 15556 13863 
White % .88 .65 .48 .30 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
 
Allston-Brighton 
Allston-Brighton, home to Boston University, is home to the largest student 
population in the city of Boston. It is also convenient (across the Charles River) to 
Cambridge, home of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
so the student and faculty population is quite high relative to other areas of the city. The 
historic neighborhoods of Allston and Brighton now share the planning district of 
Allston-Brighton, and the boundaries between the two are just as subjective as any of the 
other boundaries of the city.  Allston-Brighton does lie at the outskirts of the city, and yet 
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is more accessible from the central districts than any of the outer neighborhoods such as 
Hyde Park, Jamaica Plain, Dorchester, or West Roxbury. 
The neighborhood of Allston/Brighton saw an ethnically Asian population 
increase from just over 1,000 to 10,000 from 1970 to 2000, and saw its Republican 
enrollment rise slightly, from 2700 to 4200. Its white population had dropped by about 
5,000.  Allston-Brighton, which occupies Wards 21 and 22 in the city, has seen the 
greatest degree of Asian population increase.  However, it has been a very slow 
progression, and Asians still comprise only 10% of the neighborhood.  Marked increases 
occurred in the 1980s, when the Asian population doubled from 3,000 to 6,000, and it has 
only increased marginally ever since in the neighborhood of 70,000 residents. Most of the 
new immigrants in the 1980s were of Chinese descent. It has served as a bedrock of 
support for candidates like former mayoral candidate Sam Yoon, an Asian-American who 
saw many of his votes come from Allston-Brighton. It now has more residents of Asian 
descent than Chinatown in Boston, but in no precinct in Allston-Brighton is there a 
majority of Asian residents. It has always had a white majority, and supplied the margin 
for many victories of Republicans throughout the 1960s and 1970s, even constituting the 
base of support in some elections.   
An interesting phenomenon is the low voter turnout relative to the rest of the city 
and especially the lower turnout in state and local elections, that is, those elections not 
directly having bearing on a presidential election. This is partly why Republicans can win 
in this neighborhood. Allston-Brighton has seen an 18% overall decline in Democratic 
enrollment from 1970 to 2010, and a 2% overall Republican drop, remaining relatively 
stable.  The total white population has declined slightly, by about 5%, but the newer 
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Asian population has more than compensated for that migration difference in this 
prosperous, bustling neighborhood. 
 
 
 
Table 3.14 Allston-Brighton 
Allston-Brighton 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 2795 2069 2336 4229 
Democratic 
Enrollment 19036 15575 14206 16779 
White % 0.82 0.8 0.73 0.69 
 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill 
The Boston Redevelopment Authority has struggled to set the boundaries of study 
and neighborhood designation for both the Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill 
neighborhoods. Jamaica Plain, in neighborhood boundaries set by the BRA from 1970 to 
2000, is roughly coterminous with what many residents now call “Mission Hill.” For the 
purposes of this study, Jamaica Plain is defined demographically by the BRA (1970-
2000), and, in fact, many in the city familiar with the BRA’s boundaries believe most of 
what BRA has drawn as Jamaica Plain actually belongs in Mission Hill.  For the purposes 
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of consistency and to leave this particular matter to future, more specific research, the 
two have been combined in the election results that have been tallied and referred to 
jointly as “Jamaica Plain.”  
Both areas, have undergone waves of demographic change through the years. 
 What was once a parochial Irish neighborhood for a time became home to many Latino 
immigrants and is now seeing an increase in the white population. Indeed in the 2000s, 
however, Jamaica Plain, was subject to rapid “gentrification.” The white share of the 
population increased as a percentage of the total by 17 points.  Because it is within the 
city limits and reasonably close to the Back Bay, with many freestanding homes as well 
as apartment buildings along its main streets, college-age students have contributed to a 
relatively bohemian culture in both Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill. A significant 
Democratic enrollment increase also occurred during this decade. Over the course of the 
entire era, both Democratic and Republican enrollment declined by over 10 percent, 
while the white population declined by nearly half. 
These cases bring into stark relief the idea that, contrary to merely looking at the 
progression of a neighborhood over the entire era, some neighborhoods, such as Jamaica 
Plain, saw racial changes of different character over different decades.  For instance, 
black residents increased as a share of the population in the 1970s, and Latino residents in 
both the 1970s and the 1980s, but in neither of these cases was there any significant party 
identification change associated with the racial change.   
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Table 3.15 Jamaica Plain 
Jamaica Plain 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 1698 1330 1134 1389 
Democratic 
Enrollment 14784 10146 11263 12885 
White % .78 .59 .49 .36 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston 
Redevelopment Authority. 
Roslindale 
Like South Boston, East Boston, and West Roxbury, Roslindale counted itself a 
“defended neighborhood” during the Boston busing crisis of the 1970s.  It was a 
neighborhood on the outskirts of Boston with an ethnic white majority but soon saw that 
population decline. A significant white exodus occurred throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. In fact, the absolute number of the white population is down 58% from its height 
in 1970 in Roslindale.  Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, Latino in-migration began to 
repopulate the neighborhood. Surprisingly, there was relatively little Democratic decline, 
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in any of those eras of white exodus, and Republican enrollment stayed virtually the 
same. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.16 Roslindale 
Roslindale 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Republican  
Enrollment 1411 995 1017 1288 
Democratic 
Enrollment 12074 10642 8529 9129 
White % .96 .91 .77 .56 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, City of Boston and U.S. Census Reports 
from the Boston Redevelopment Authority.  
 
Reflections on the Neighborhoods of Boston 
After the Civil Rights era, no decade saw a neighborhood with a significant 
decrease in either the Latino or Asian populations, but not so with the white and black 
populations.  White population decrease is associated with virtually every racial change 
in Boston during this era, but concerning declines in the black population, only in one 
neighborhood was there significant racial change in multiple decades: Roxbury in the 
1980s, which saw a concurrent significant racial increase for Latino residents. 
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 Several interesting trends that are worth noting.  Findings of association between 
Boston neighborhoods in terms of party identification change and racial change, coupled 
with the larger national and regional trends regarding racial attitudes among political 
party identifiers, seems to point to a certain consistency.  Namely, a consistency exists 
within party ideology that would suggest identification and even voter registration with a 
political party is heavily associated with attitudes regarding race.  Thus, the formation of 
governmental policy exists alongside a local experience of changing neighborhood 
demographics.   
By breaking the city of Boston into its constituent neighborhoods, certain trends 
quickly become evident in those micro-polities. The starkest demographic change is 
captured in Map 3 and Map 4, found in the Appendices. The first (“Map 3”) shows 1970s 
data on neighborhoods and the degree to which they are majority white or plurality or 
majority nonwhite.  In the 1970s only Roxbury and South End were mostly nonwhite, 
whereas in by 2000 there was a significant racial change that seems to have occurred. By 
2000, racial and ethnic demographics in the city of Boston was transformed. By then, the 
South End was majority white, and Jamaica Plain, North Dorchester, South Dorchester, 
Mattapan and Hyde Park were nonwhite.23 Party identification trends and the racial 
trends within the city can and should be studied in conjunction. The entire data set of 
Republican share of the two-party gubernatorial vote by neighborhood in the post-Civil 
Rights Era is posted below. The largest and most consistent difference is between South 
Boston and Roxbury. This is true especially when the Republican and Democratic sides 
of a campaign mark a stark departure from articulating the interests of the neighborhood 
from one election to the next. In no other neighborhoods are there as many joint 
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fluctuations of partisan support there are in these two.  Southie and Roxbury are perhaps 
bounded by race more than any other neighborhoods in Boston.  Roxbury is the historic 
home, as noted above, of Boston’s black population.  Southie was the site of racial 
violence and national attention in the 1970s.  It is those neighborhoods which became the 
focal point of racial politics statewide during the ensuing decades. The identification of 
the interests of either neighborhood became central, rhetorically and strategically, to the 
campaigns of both major parties. It may even be said, in the language of American 
Political Development, that the explicit racial identification of both neighborhoods in the 
early 1970s could be classified as a critical juncture in the political development of 
Massachusetts, ensuring a path dependence of continuous racialized political 
development for the remainder of the era. 
In Table 3.17, the entire Republican share of the major-party vote, by 
neighborhood, is listed throughout the post-Civil Rights era.  Roxbury, the Back 
Bay/Beacon Hill neighborhood, and South Boston are themselves worthy of attention. 
They are the pillars of consistency as well as the surrogates for the black, wealthy, and 
working-class white votes, respectively. For instance, there often is a stark shift 
especially in these places toward one candidate or another, but also note the patterns that 
emerge: after 1990, South Boston became a consistent Republican stronghold, which it 
never had been before. 
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Table 3.17 Republican Share of Two-Party Massachusetts Gubernatorial Vote, By 
Neighborhood, 1970-200224 
  
70 74 78 82 86 90 94 98 02 
Back Bay .66 .56 .82 .33 .25 .62 .68 .47 .53 
Fenway .61 .62 .64 .27 .18 .55 .57 .29 .32 
Central .50 .59 .47 .36 .27 .56 .68 .51 .45 
W.Roxbury .68 .50 .29 .44 .39 .42 .65 .50 .50 
South End .46 .56 .74 .21 .17 .52 .58 .31 .32 
S.Boston .52 .41 .17 .48 .36 .29 .65 .57 .45 
Allston .55 .45 .51 .23 .19 .46 .60 .35 .37 
East Boston .45 .37 .32 .33 .29 .44 .68 .58 .45 
Hyde Park .64 .44 .25 .37 .34 .42 .64 .43 .35 
Charlestown .42 .41 .20 .34 .27 .39 .56 .50 .50 
Roslindale .62 .42 .28 .36 .29 .41 .60 .41 .34 
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Jamaica P. .57 .47 .39 .29 .22 .47 .48 .26 .22 
N.Dorchester .53 .42 .27 .30 .24 .37 .53 .35 .28 
Mattapan .50 .55 .59 .09 .12 .33 .45 .17 .12 
S.Dorchester .59 .44 .26 .33 .26 .34 .57 .39 .30 
Roxbury .29 .70 .73 .07 .07 .37 .48 .19 .17 
 
Several phenomena emerge during this era: Many neighborhoods have seen a 
severe percentage (proportional) decline in Democratic enrollment, and all but a few have 
seen an absolute decline in that enrollment. A few have seen significant increases in 
Republican enrollment.  Only a very few have seen a very significant decrease in 
Republican party identification enrollment during that time period, and those 
neighborhoods have some interesting commonalities which would seem to indicate an 
uptick in Republican identification in the city with a new type of voter who had been 
traditionally Democratic. The rest seem to fit into the pattern of increasing nonpartisan 
enrollment, suggesting many causes that currently are hotly debated in political science, 
but which will only be studied here within the context of the Boston case. Below, the 
table demonstrates the consistency of Republican support for virtually all offices, 
juxtaposed with the inconsistent participation and support of Democratic voters for their 
candidates. This appears to be less of a trend toward independent voting than simply a 
case of two very diferent standards of participation among supporters of the two major 
parties. 
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Table 3.18 
Average partisan turnout (among selected competitive elections) in overall 
citywide election, 1970-2010 (in thousands)25 
 President Governor Mayor* 
Republican  54 55 50 
Democratic 136 86 71 
*Republican-leaning candidates coded by author, Boston mayoral elections non-partisan. 
As is plain in the above table, the vote did not vary more than 5-10% among 
Republican candidates26 in competitive elections. Democrats, however, had a more 
difficult time retaining a victorious coalition.  In presidential elections, the average 
Democratic turnout was as high as 136,000 votes, but could garner as many as 200,000 
votes or as little as 95,000. Democrats were good for roughly 70,000 votes on average in 
the Governor’s race, but could range from 50,000 to 110,000. In mayoral elections, when 
often the city Democratic party would back a candidate and interests more aligned with 
the Republian party may back another candidate, the split was more even. 
Conclusion 
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Many of these neighborhoods hosted similar patterns and can reasonably be 
grouped into several main categories: South Boston, West Roxbury, and Charlestown 
were and remain white ethnic majority, working-class neighborhoods, which in the past 
were Democratic-leaning and have grown to form the new base of the Republican party. 
 The Back Bay/Beacon Hill, the Fenway, the North End, and Allston-Brighton are all still 
majority white, center-city neighborhoods of some affluence that did constitute the 
Republican base in the city, but now operate more as swing vote districts that may tilt 
Republican in some elections. Roxbury and the South End are historically majority-black 
neighborhoods which have seen a migration of their black population out in favor of 
Latino, Asian, and white movement. East Boston, Jamaica Plain, and Roslindale are all 
historically working-class white neighborhoods at the outskirts of the city that now are 
home to large Latino populations, in one case a majority, but still with a relatively large 
white plurality in the other two. Hyde Park, Dorchester and Mattapan have all shifted 
from majority white to majority or plurality black neighborhoods gradually over the 
course of this era. This typology reveals several phenomena: the shifting character of 
racial makeup of many of the neighborhoods in the city, the accompanying shift in 
partisan dynamics in the city from a relatively competitive Republican-Democratic two-
party system to a strong Democratic party presence, while seeing the suburban-focused 
Republican party compete only seriously in working-class white areas with a history of 
racial conflict. Residual Republican support may still come from the wealthier, white 
majority neighborhoods.  
Many of the same patterns still persist in Boston politics, as we can see from the 
enrollment data: white residents leaving or entering a neighborhood has a determinative 
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effect on Republican enrollment, minority participation has not historically been as high 
as white voter participation, and Democratic enrollment has been declining everywhere.  
Because of the abundance of focus on the “new Boston” in demographic data in the past 
several decades, these truths remain.  The four main demographic groups of the city may 
fluctuate in number and may indeed trade numerical dominance of neighborhoods, but 
one fact seems to remain: residential segregation of these neighborhoods is not a relic of 
the past, but an ongoing concern of the present that will necessitate political coalition-
building and consensus rather than conflict.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTIONS: CRIME, WELFARE, AND RACE 
 
Republican candidates for state once offered a moderate brand of conservatism, 
and in the immediate post-civil rights era they were able to garner a substantial number of 
votes within the city. By the 1990s that was no longer the case. This chapter will chart the 
development of racial conservatism in the campaign rhetoric of a number of key elected 
officials from the 1970s through 2002. The relatively moderate conservatism of Senator 
Edward Brooke and Governor Francis W. Sargent is replaced, by the early 1990s, with 
racial conservatism. The role of national figures, especially Reagan, is considered. The 
campaign speeches and administration speeches are from all Republican governors 
elected in Massachusetts after 1970, including  William Weld in (1990 and 1994),  Paul 
Cellucci (1998), and Mitt Romney (2002) all of which illustrate the importance of racial 
conservatism to state politics.1 
The Decline of Moderate Racial Liberalism 
Francis W. Sargent was elected Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts in 1966 on 
the same ticket with incumbent Governor John Volpe. This was, incidentally, the first 
election for a full four-year term as governor of Massachusetts.  For almost two centuries, 
governors in the Bay State had been elected to two-year terms.  Now, all elections for 
Massachusetts governor would coincide with presidential “midterm” elections.  Sargent 
was on the Republican ticket for the first three of these elections, and in the latter two he 
was the official standard-bearer of the Republican party. Volpe had previously held the 
office in 1961, and, presumably as a reward for helping Nixon win the state in the 1968 
presidential election, Volpe was appointed and confirmed as the president’s Secretary of 
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Transportation, putting Sargent in the driver’s seat as acting governor. Sargent would 
soon run for election and win in his own right in 1970.   
Also in 1966, Edward W. Brooke, the first African-American elected statewide 
official in Massachusetts political history as Attorney General, was elected to a full term 
in the United States Senate from the Bay State to replace retiring Republican Leverett 
Saltonstall. Brooke won a bruising primary but assembled a coalition that relied on the 
traditional white Yankee Republican base in the city of Boston and the suburbs and rural 
areas across the state but which was also inclusive of virtually every majority-black 
neighborhood in the city of Boston.  He kept this coalition throughout his tenure in office 
though it weakened enough for his marginal defeat in 1978.  
Brooke and Sargent had a remarkable degree of agreement, and as a team, it 
seemed their only areas of significant disagreement were rooted in the primacy of their 
respective levels of government (federal and state), which can fairly be chalked up to 
perspectivism.  On major issues, their rhetoric was extremely similar on issues of crime, 
welfare, education, and urban plight.  In some ways, their views anticipate what would be 
central to Republican rhetoric on matters of poverty, welfare and crime by the 1980s.  For 
example, Edward Brooke employed language that drew on the view that poverty was an 
artifact of a culture, as opposed to economic forces. Brooke spoke at length in his 1966 
campaign book The Challenge of Change of the “disadvantaged Negro” and the need to 
practice a brand of “bootstrap” philosophical conservatism in government.  Brooke can 
even be read as perpetuating black stereotypes:  
There have always been poor people—but now they seem more listless and 
hopeless, and seem to personify the decline of the city itself.  There have always 
been frustrated minorities—but now, as Newsweek has deftly put  “the melting 
pot no longer melts, it only boils.’”2 [emphasis added] 
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His assessment of government’s ability to address poverty was pessimistic: 
 
No subsidy, service, or study that is not specifically planned to replace 
incompetence and fatalism with talents and aspirations can succeed.3 [emphasis 
added] 
 
 
However, Brooke did believe in the importance of subsidy to the poor, and he 
acknowledged that sometime provision was inadequate: 
Relief payments too must be increased where relief is needed.  For in most states 
the level of relief is appallingly low…They do not allow the families involved to 
make the investment in education and training for themselves and their children 
necessary to break free from poverty.4  [emphasis added] 
 
Sargent’s view of welfare is also decidedly negative in tone and indeed implied 
that there is significant welfare fraud despite the noble mission of the program: 
In Massachusetts, the word ‘welfare’ has come to mean the Public Welfare 
system. lt is past due time to tighten, to scrutinize, to ride herd on programs 
designed to help the helpless but too often abused by the unscrupulous 5 …[we 
should] “support welfare programs aimed at moving people from welfare rolls to 
payrolls.”6 [emphasis added] 
 
Once elected to office in his own right in 1970, Sargent even attempted to “wipe 
out hunger” through “a proper mixture of  the food stamp and commodity distribution 
programs, combined with implementation of the newly revised federal school lunch 
program to ensure that every child have a healthful lunch at school each day.” (1969) At 
the same time, however, he attempted to maintain “fiscal responsibility,” scoring political 
points for disparaging those who allegedly abuse the systems of welfare and Medicaid:  
Welfare and Medicaid represent almost half of the state’s budget, and their costs 
soar  not because recipients get more  but because the system wastes more. Let’s 
get rid of it. Let’s abolish the Department of Public Welfare.  Let’s create two 
smaller and separate agencies. One to handle payments and eligibility, and the 
other to deliver social services. Social workers will serve recipients, financial 
experts will protect the taxpayer against fraud  and we will have better service for 
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less money. …Both savings and service ...that is what I propose.7 [emphasis 
added] 
 
These aforementioned policy statements reflect Sargent’s interpretive lens: he 
combined a view of a more administratively lean public service provision, which would 
be a more generous provision and  the view that social policy could improve social 
programs. On the matter of support to mothers and families on welfare, Sargent 
supported expanding services when necessary: 
I will rush the opening of day-care centers so welfare mothers can go back to 
work knowing their children are cared for.8 [emphasis added] 
 
Sargent also had what would today be called “liberal” views on crime and crime 
prevention:  
We will file legislation and take administrative action to deal with the problems of 
mental health, drug abuse, and alcoholism, treating the alcoholic as a patient not 
a criminal, for the sick are healed by hospitals, not jails.9  [emphasis added] 
 
Governor Sargent also vetoed a renewal of the death penalty in 1974, during his re-
election year.   
Finally, on the issue of public education, Sargent and Brooke both saw the need 
for racial integration in public schools, particularly in Boston, where an extremely high-
profile federal case was playing out before the eyes of the nation. Before any of this 
occurred, Brooke let his feelings on the subject of integration be known: 
The Negro wants to live in an integrated society with all that that implies.  He no 
longer is willing to live on the outside looking in.  He wants his children to attend 
good schools.  But he also wants them to attend integrated schools.  He wants 
school busing as necessary but temporary relief in the establishment of integrated 
schools.  But he also wants the destruction of the Negro ghetto which, among 
other benefits, will establish permanent school integration.  He wants equal job 
opportunities and equal pay for equal skills and equal services.10[emphasis added] 
 
 
 83 
 
Sargent did not have the luxury to pontificate on the issue in a hyptothetical sense. 
His political future rested largely on his ability to capitalize on the crisis which had 
emerged leading to mass demonstrations, protests, and a general uproar in South Boston, 
West Roxbury, the North End, and other majority-white working class neighborhoods in 
the city.  As a member of the party of Nixon, who opposed busing for integration, 
Sargent could have opposed the policy as well and challenged it in the courts. He did not. 
Instead, he took to the airwaves on May 11, 1974, and painstakingly justified his 
position: 
You must understand what is at stake in the decision I confront—and what 
underlies the highly-charged emotions that have led to so intense an opposition to 
this law, that has caused one of the most progressive legislatures in America vote 
to repeal one of the nation’s most historic efforts to further social justice . . . In 
both Boston and Springfield we have plans that put the total burden for change on 
black and white working people in the inner city—and no burden on the richer, 
mainly white suburbs . . . My answer to the demand that we turn back the clock 
nine years, that we wipe out the commitment we have made is simple, firm and 
deeply felt. No . . . Integration is the responsibility of our whole society not one 
geographic area, not a handful of neighborhoods, not a tiny segment of the 
population of two of our major cities—Boston and Springfield.11 
 
Six months later, Sargent was unable to win election a second term in 1974.  He 
had taken unpopular positions both on taxes (raising revenue) and school busing.  
Similarly, Boston Mayor Kevin White, whom Sargent had defeated in his first bid for 
governor in 1970, was a charismatic leader usually thought of as a governor-in-waiting, 
but White had acquired the derisive nickname “Mayor Black” as a result of his support 
for the federally-mandated public school integration policy.12 He never did win the 
governorship, but held on to the mayor’s office until 1979.  
Sargent’s plan on school busing was in and of itself an interesting case study: he 
had attempted as best he could to both capitalize on and mediate between the divisions 
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caused by the federal school busing mandate from federal Judge Arthur Garrity13. Sargent 
had taken to the airwaves and announced his own plan for how to implement school 
busing and integration in a new way that would both honor the principles of racial 
integration and allow school boards to have more control over their policies. This did not 
work, and his vote in Boston declined from 96,000 to 60,000 in the intervening four 
years.14 
Sargent was defeated by a young Michael Dukakis in 1974, who  had little to say, 
however, about school busing and even won votes in places like South Boston arguably 
because voters were dissatisfied with the incumbent Sargent’s handling of the issue.  
Two points about Sargent are worth underscoring. One is the margin of support 
for the Volpe and Sargent ticket was similar in most suburban counties (in, indeed in 
most counties statewide) to the neighborhood margins. The neighborhoods that saw 
increased support for Sargent, even in his loss, were Mattapan and Roxbury, and the 
South End, as well as the traditional Republican base in the Back Bay/Beacon Hill 
neighborhood.   
The counties that saw the most similar margin to the Back Bay and Beacon Hill 
district, and the Central Boston district (including the Italian-dominated and relatively 
ancient North End neighborhood) was Barnstable on the so-called South Shore (and 
Dukes County, mostly synonymous with Martha’s Vineyard, a quintessential vacation 
island for the wealthy and well-to-do, and Nantucket) . These neighborhoods and the 
South Shore represent the base of the Republican party in 1970. The North Shore county 
of Essex County is also relatively high in support for Sargent in this period.  
 85 
 
The second point concerns his policy positions. Like Brooke, Sargent believed in 
limited government, law enforcement and related policies. However, like Massachusetts 
Republicans of that era, Sargent saw a positive role for government. While he certainly 
harbored stereotypical views about blacks and the poor, he discussed policies about social 
welfare provision and crime in a much more nuanced way than his counterparts in the 
1990s would. Moreover, he stood by the enforcement of the most divisive social policy in 
post-civil rights Boston city politics. 
Republicans failed in consecutive bids for governor after Sargent’s term. Micheal 
Dukakis won in 1974 and, again, in 1982, 1984, and 1988. His loss to Edward J. King, 
however, might be instructive as evidence of the evolution of racial conservatism as a 
campaign ploy. A recession in late 1974 and 1975 had seen an exponential increase in the 
demand for social welfare benefits, which in turn squeezed the taxpayer base, and 
Dukakis was vulnerable. According to the Globe:  
Unemployment rose by more than 50 percent in a single year—1974-75.  Welfare, 
Medicaid, for the working poor, and unemployment compensation leapt skyward. 
By the time Michael S. Dukakis came to his senses in the spring of 1975, he was 
forced not only to enact the largest general tax increase in state history, but also to 
take an unheard-of step: requesting a separate major tax program to support $450 
million of state borrowing to meet current expenses.15 
Such policy programs did not prove popular.  Dukakis was defeated in the 1978 
Democratic gubernatorial primary by the much more conservative Democrat Ed King, 
who also won the general election against moderate Republican Frank Hatch. King won, 
at least in part, by employing racial conservatism: 
Having been caricatured by East Boston neighbors as a human bulldozer when he 
was executive director of Massport, King ran a similar campaign against 
incumbent Governor Michael Dukakis in 1978. In their TV debate, an instant 
classic, King managed to answer, nearly every question, regardless of subject 
matter, with some portion of a reminder that he favored capital punishment and 
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opposed taxes, welfare, and abortion. To many it seemed a boorish performance, 
but it succeeded in distinguishing King with crystal clarity. On primary 
day, King took the nomination by a comfortable 75,000 votes.16 
 
King’s crude, racially conservative manner clearly appealed to white South 
Boston voters, and not black Roxbury voters in the primary. King found it useful, in light 
of an apparent backlash against welfare, to capitalize on the success and even the 
program of Ronald Reagan, the losing candidate in the 1976 Republican presidential 
nomination campaign and former California governor, a seemingly odd strategy for a 
Boston-area Democrat, but one that proved successful.  He retained the services of 
Robert B. Carleson, Reagan’s former California welfare commissioner who seemingly 
popularized the idea of “waste, fraud, and abuse” being the most cost-effective and 
policy-neutral way of saving taxpayer money in the welfare system.17 King boasted of 
being able to save as much as $300 million annually at the time, while the official plan 
from Carleson, who appeared at press conferences with King of roughly $140 million.  In 
office King emphasized the same issue.18  
His opposition to welfare remained central to his re-election strategy in 1982, 
which he ultimately lost.  His brash manner was clear in the primary’s final televised 
debate closing statement: “I ask that you put personalities aside and ask yourself four 
simple questions.  Who has cut taxes? Who has taken the tough stance against crime? 
Who has cut welfare fraud? Who has created new jobs? I have.19 
Only in majority-black Roxbury, the gentrifying South End, and the Yankee Back 
Bay during the 1978 election did Republicans (who had a liberal standard-bearer in 
Francis Hatch) see a margin of victory in any of the neighborhoods in either 1978 or 
1982.   But after that, Republican candidates for governor in Massachusetts followed a 
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simple campaign strategy: they pressed traditional calls for lower taxes and limited 
government coupled with an emphasis racial conservatism that played upon anti-black 
sentiment among whites in and out of Boston—this translated to a heavy emphasis on 
punitive criminal justice approaches, and restricted access to social welfare provisions. 
Using this type of campaign rhetoric and advertisement strategy, William Weld won the 
governor’s race in 1990 and 1994, defeating Democrats John Silber and Mark Roosevelt, 
respectively. Republican Paul Cellucci defeated Democrat Scott Harshbarger in 1998. 
After Repblican Jane Swift’s brief tenure, Mitt Romney ran on the Republican ticket and 
defeated Democratic nominee Shannon O’Brien in 2002.  
As will be discussed further, the string of success of Republican candidates is 
noteworthy for at least two reasons. 1) During this time the Democratic Party dominated 
at the mayoral, state and Congressional levels; 2) Republican candidates depended upon 
white public’s grossly uninformed views of poverty and crime.  
Welfare Queens, Underclass Ideology, and the Contract for America 
In one sense, Republican success in Massachusetts in the 1990s reflected the 
strategy of racial conservatism made popular by Reagan in California as governor, and 
subsequently during his races for the White House.  
The first exposure Massachusetts voters had to Ronald Reagan was media 
coverage of the 1976 New Hampshire Republican primary, which only preceded the Bay 
State primary by a few weeks. Reagan was nothing if not consistent: he campaigned on 
dismantling the welfare state and any and all programs that advantaged poor, black and 
brown people, including at one point a commitment to repealing the Civil Rights Act. 
The start of the 1976 presidential campaign offered a chance to Reagan and his 
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supporters to dethrone President Ford as head of the Republican party. Partly on a plan to 
reduce government, Reagan secured forty-six percent of the primary vote, giving Ford the 
closest incumbent margin of victory in the history of the New Hampshire primary. As 
reported by 1976 Reagan campaign beat reporter Benjamin Taylor, Reagan’s overall 
proposal set the tone for Republican attacks through the twenty-first century: 
Under the plan as originally constructed, a Reagan administration would kill 
enough federal programs to not only balance the budget, but to also cut personal 
Federal income taxes by $25 billion or 23 percent, and even to pay off $5 billion 
of the national debt which has swelled to $566 billion...The programs to be cut 
would include all Federal aid to education (excluding research); manpower 
training; community and regional development, including housing and urban 
development programs; many of the government’s transportation programs; and 
social welfare programs such as food stamps, unemployment compensation, 
public assistance, aid to families with dependent children, and the Medicaid 
program.20   
  
These proposals targeted the Great Society and War on Poverty programs of the 1960s, 
which were arguably some of the crowning achievements of the Civil Rights Movement, 
aimed at improving the lives of millions, disprortionately African-American.  Reagan 
made his racial conservatism plain during a clandestine meeting with ROAR (Restore 
Our Alienated Rights, the main South Boston anti-busing parents and citizens group).   
Reagan stood to gain from obliquely leaking the meeting with the small group of 
activists. The story, and Reagan’s views on busing, made it to page one of the Boston 
Globe: 
The meeting was held in Manchester on Jan. 7 and was attended by about 10 
opponents of court-ordered busing in Boston.  The Boston group had requested 
the meeting and asked that it not be publicized….In a New York Times interview 
last week, Reagan was asked about court-ordered busing in Boston and said, “I 
think the judge’s orders were wrong.”  [Reagan spokesman James] Lake said 
Reagan told the Boston group that he is opposed to mandatory busing and 
bringing it to a halt will be “one of his highest priorities.”21 
 
To be sure, Reagan was not running for mayor of South Boston or senator from New 
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Hampshire. It is simply useful to acknowledge that Boston busing was the racialized and 
polarizing controversy of the day, and Manchester was part of the Boston media market 
and had seen and read all about it, and Manchester voters likely had some personal ties to 
the controversy as well. 
 A few days after this story was leaked, at a candidate Q&A session in Dublin, 
New Hampshire,Reagan demonstrated his disregard for the concerns of people served by 
programs he was attempting to eliminate: 
During the question-and-answer period, John Colony of Harrisvile asked the 
former governor how minorities would be able to sustain their gains of the past 20 
years without protection of the Federal government . . .Noting that he had lived in 
Louisiana while in the Coast Guard, the 30-year-old Colony said: “I’m concerned 
about what would happen to minorities as far as education is concerned if you 
turn control over to conservative state legislatures…” Reagan’s answer was 
twofold.  First, he said that even with the transfer of power over social programs 
to state and local governments, the Federal government would retain the 
responsibility of upholding the Constitution...Secondly, Reagan pointed to the 
“great migration of Negroes from the South” in this country and said people have 
the right of “voting with their feet” by moving from one state to another.22 
 
This statement couldn’t be more clear, as it signals Reagan’s commitment to policies that 
resonated among certain white constituents, not black or other minority voters. People 
had every right to leave the state, but not a right to equal treatment while living in it. 
When Reagan returned to New England in 1980 for another run at the presidency 
during King’s tenure on Beacon Hill, he sat down several times with Boston Globe 
reporters to help clarify and amplify his views, improve his accessibility, thus improving 
upon his messaging.  The political stances he expounds upon are not noticeably different 
from his former stances, and his lack of patience for arguments in favor of explicit racial 
liberalism could not be clearer, especially with the reporter’s apparent sympathy to 
Reagan’s stereotypically driven views of “social breakdown”:  
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Q. But, obviously, there is some social breakdown, particularly in poorer 
communities. You have kids who have not had parental supervision . . . and if 
you're against abortion, it would seem to me you'd be in favor of their being able 
to obtain contraceptives. 
A. Well, and the government also steps in there. In some of our inner cities, there 
are actual cases, many more of them than you would believe, where young girls, 
under-age, deliberately go out to have a baby so that they can get what they 
call "a pad of their own" because by getting the baby, unmarried, they can 
then become put on the Aid to Dependent Children program, and she'll get 
on that program, and it's because of the pregnancy - the pregnancy makes 
her eligible for the welfare program. Being on the welfare program makes 
her eligible for Medicaid. So she then goes and gets rid of the baby, and the 
government pays for it with tax dollars, and the government is bound by law 
to protect her privacy and not to let her own parents know that they are 
okaying her right to go and have this operation. Now there seems to be a 
pretty big inconsistency in this…. 
….Q. In 66, you were quoted as saying you were opposed to the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, as an example of federal intrusion. 
A. I was opposed at the time - I can't remember the exact details - not for the idea 
of doing something against prejudice, certainly. I was opposed to certain 
features of that law which went beyond and infringed on the individual 
rights of citizens which are supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Q. Which features? 
A. Well, they had to do with the, let's say, the person who owns property, his 
right to do with his property what he wants to do. 
A. You mean discriminate in renting it or discriminate in selling it? 
A. At that time, this was what I thought was interfering with the right, 
particularly, with the idea of selling. I recognize that that could lend itself to the 
same prejudice that we're talking about, and I'm opposed to that prejudice…..I 
played on a college football team alongside a black who's today my best 
friend, when this was not commonplace. [all emphasis added in these interview 
excerpts] 
Reagan’s policy positions, once again, are both implicitly racially conservative 
(campaigning actively against welfare with familiar anti-poor people tropes) and 
explicitly conservative—he rehashes familiar arguments against the Civil Rights Act, the 
cornerstone of the Civil Rights movement.  
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Another interview is also illuminating in terms of Reagan’s view of “people on 
welfare” and Medicaid:  
Q. Speaking of federal programs, you criticized Kennedy's proposed health 
insurance proposal, calling it "Teddy care,” but what alternative do you offer? 
A. Well, I've asked our people to look into the idea of private health insurance 
field - 179 million Americans have hospital insurance. Nine out of 10 of those 
have surgical insurance along with it. Eight of ten have general medical insurance 
along with it. Now, that's a pretty good chunk of our people. Now you have 
Medicare for the elderly and you have Medicaid for the medically indigent - the 
people on welfare and the people of such low earnings that they can't provide 
for themselves. The programs for both of those groups - Medicaid-Medicaid has 
been exposed as filled with fraud. It has been exposed as terrifically 
extravagant.23 [emphasis added] 
President-elect Reagan, after winning New Hampshire in both the primary and the 
general election this time, felt it necessary, in late November 1980, to continue his 
rhetorical promise from 1976, if not fulfill it. He was always careful to make any 
implication of racism explicitly denied, as Rachelle Patterson reported in a Globe story: 
“Well now," Reagan said, "let me make this answer very carefully, because I want 
everyone to understand that I am heart-and-soul in favor of the things that 
have been done under the name of civil rights, desegregation and so forth….I 
happen to believe, however, and have felt for a long time and I think a great many 
of the black leaders agree also, that busing has been a failure and is not 
accomplishing the purpose, a worthwhile purpose that gave it birth. So, therefore, 
I think there are better ways to achieve the ends than by continuing this program.”  
. . . Reagan said he would sign anti-busing legislation as President. But the issue 
may be academic next year since he is expected to choose an Attorney General 
and officials of the Justice Department who reflect his views. It is unlikely that 
the Justice Department next year will pursue busing as a tool.24 [emphasis added] 
 
Reagan’s political persona as the champion of implicit racial conservatism is thus 
intertwined with his early candidacy appearances in the crucial primary state of New 
Hampshire. 
Back in Massachusetts, Governor Sargent was defeated by a young Michael 
Dukakis in 1974. Dukakis had little to say about school busing and even won votes in 
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places like South Boston arguably because voters were dissatisfied with the incumbent 
Sargent’s handling of the issue. South Boston was also hostile to Senator Brooke, giving 
a majority of votes to the opposing Democrat in each of this three elections, in 1966, 
1972 and 1978.  
However, 1976 saw a Republican primary in Massachusetts for the presidency (a 
few weeks after New Hampshire), and former California Governor Ronald Reagan won 
the most votes in South Boston among GOP voters.25  The same disparity existed in 
reverse when it comes to Roxbury, Brooke as the winner and Reagan the loser. Brooke 
seemed to acknowledge openly that he and Reagan appealed to different constituencies, 
and that they were not necessarily on the same electoral side.26  
Asked whether he would accept a vice presidential nomination if Reagan would 
be the eventual Republican nominee, Brooke said: “I doubt it.  I don’t think we 
could reach an accommodation.  We disagree on various issues.” 
Brooke doubts that either Reagan or his cause will succeed in 1976, saying: “I 
don’t think there are enough conservatives in the primaries to nominate Ronald 
Reagan over an incumbent President or incumbent Vice President.  He has 
emotional appeal, sure, on issues like busing or welfare.  But we need a more 
centrist candidate.  Look what happened to the Democrats with George 
McGovern in ’72.  The same thing would happen to us.27 [emphasis added] 
 
Just as Republicans Brooke and Reagan were not apparently ideological allies, the 
same could be said of Democrats Ed King and Michael Dukakis, who faced each other in 
the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary. In a very interesting irony, the very insult 
Dukakis used to defeat King in a Democratic primary, that King was “Reagan’s favorite 
Democratic governor” was first used in a Dukakis television ad.  Dukakis’ exaggeration 
became accepted truth, as King never held another elective office, and changed his 
registration to Republican three years after leaving office.  No retrospective article on 
King’s life and career would be complete again without that supposed (erroneous) quote 
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from Reagan.28  
So it was that in the mid-1970s, the Republican party of Massachusetts began to 
suffer a dry spell in gubernatorial elections that lasted throughout the 1980s, even though 
Reagan won the state’s electoral votes in both 1980 and 1984. This comes at a time when 
there is a large degree of increases in white population in the suburbs and exurbs, and 
continued decrease in the white population in most neighborhoods in Boston.  
Massachusetts as a whole remained overwhelmingly white, and Boston as a whole did, as 
well.  However, Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis managed to keep Republicans 
out of the corner office for sixteen years in part by remaining popular in the city of 
Boston and maintaining an electoral base there.29  
John W. Sears, a party functionary, picked up some of the more conservative 
voters in the 1982 election.  He was also defeated by Dukakis in this contest, however, 
and so in 1983 Dukakis began his second gubernatorial administration, after the third 
straight Democratic victory and Republican loss. Dukakis became the focus of 
conservative Republican antipathy during the 1980s, and most of what occurred in 
conservative growth in Massachusetts was indeed over his objection.  Massachusetts and 
the city of Boston have a history, like many states, of citizen initiatives and referenda.  
Several of those referenda are policy-based, conservative-fueled referenda that would 
indicate support for the Reagan Republican agenda.  While Republicans could not seem 
to get elected to statewide elected office in 1980s Massachusetts (including 1986 
nominee George Kariotis30), the germ of support for the later Republican base of Weld, 
Cellucci and Romney is foreshadowed in the voting percentages seen in the following 
neigborhoods that voted in favor of the death penalty, the tax revolt measure, and the 
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abortion ban (See Table 4.1). Whether they become law is irrelevant to the their utility in 
measuring neighborhood opinion breakdowns, but only Proposition 2 ½ ever saw the 
light of day beyond these votes.31 
 
1980s and the Beginnings of a White Republican Resurgence 
 
From 1970 until 2002, a small subset of public policy issues dominated the 
majority of the political discourse in Massachusetts: taxes, education, crime, and social 
welfare/health care, and perhaps rightly so. School quality, integration, and funding are a 
legitimate matter of public concern, as is the strength of the safety net in a capitalistic 
economy. 
 Despite substantial support in many sections of the city in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the  Republican party was not competitive in gubernatorial campaigns, evidenced by 
voting data in Boston neighborhoods during that period. This changed in the 1990s, and, 
as noted in previous chapters, Republican appeal was stronger in certain sections of the 
city.  By the 1990s the nature of the electorate in the city has changed and so had the 
campaign strategy.  
The germs of support for the later Republican base of Weld, Cellucci, and 
Romney are foreshadowed in the voting percentages of the following Boston 
neigborhoods that voted for referenda in favor of the death penalty, the tax revolt 
measure, and the abortion ban. There is a strong correlation between percentage white 
and support for lower taxes, death penalty reinstatement, and an abortion ban. 
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Table 4.1 
Percentage Support for Referenda in Boston during the 1980s,  
by selected neighborhoods 
 
 % White 
(1980-90) 
Anti-Tax 
Proposition 
2 ½ (1980) 
Death Penalty 
Reinstatemen
t (1982) 
Abortion 
Ban 
(1986) 
East Boston  96-76 69 65 52 
West Roxbury 97-95 69 63 52 
Hyde Park & 
Mattapan 
47-38 64 60 48 
South Boston 99-96 61 69 64 
Central (North 
End) 
80-74 61 49 32 
Charlestown 98-95 60 60 49 
South Dorchester 66-50 58 58 55 
Back Bay 91-89 53 39 15 
North Dorchester 70-59 52 51 46 
Allston-Brighton 87-74 51 45 34 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Boston Redevelopment Authority 
The data capture the sorts of policies understood to represent the “blend” of ideas about 
limited government with ideas about social control and “morality.” Over this same period 
of time, the “black wards” in the City of Boston where a majority black population 
resided, show a different pattern. The table below shows opposition to the death penalty 
and support for Dukakis, and there is a clear association between those two data points 
and the percentage of white residents of a particular ward. 
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Table 4.2 
Percentage Opposed to Death Penalty Referendum in Boston during the 
1980s, and support for Dukakis in Same Election (1982), by Ward32 
 Nonwhite Oppose 
Death 
Penalty 
Dukakis 
Ward 12 (Roxbury) 98 83 93 
Ward 14 (Dorchester) 97 83 94 
Ward 9 (Roxbury) 90 80 93 
Ward 8 (South End, 
Roxbury) 
78 59 86 
Ward 11 (Mission Hill) 59 64 82 
Ward 17 (South Dorchester) 58 52 74 
Ward 10 (Mission Hill) 57 60 78 
Ward 15 (Dorchester) 48 50 76 
Ward 13 (Dorchester) 39 48 69 
Ward 18 (Hyde Park, 
Mattapan) 
31 40 67 
Ward 21 (Allston-Brighton) 29 60 81 
Ward 4 (Back Bay, Fenway) 29 66 74 
Ward 3 (Central) 20 51 64 
Ward 5 (Back Bay, Fenway) 16 61 69 
Ward 19 (Jamaica Plain, 
Mission Hill) 
15 52 65 
Ward 22 (Allston-Brighton) 13 50 74 
Ward 6 (South Boston) 8 30 48 
Ward 1 (East Boston) 4 35 67 
Ward 16 (South Dorchester) 3 36 62 
Ward 2 (Charlestown) 2 40 66 
Ward 20 (West Roxbury) 1 37 57 
Ward 7 (South Boston) 1 32 55 
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Boston Redevelopment Authority 
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Racial Conservatism in the 1990s 
 
Before returning to the analysis of Massachusetts gubernatorial politics, it is worth 
discussing how ubiquitous racial conservatism was in national politics leading up to, and 
including, the 1990s: 
● Nixon implicitly bemoaned civil rights demonstrations as a disruption of “law and 
order” and campaigned against this disruption.33  
● Segregationist George Wallace won an overwhelming majority of votes in South 
Boston during the 1976 Democratic presidential primary.34  
● Ronald Reagan launched his national campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the 
location of the 1964 murder of civil rights activists Goodwin, Chaney and 
Schwerner. He pledged his allegiance to “states’ rights,” a coded nod and wink to 
racial segregationist sentiment among whites in that state. As mentioned before, 
he argued for curtailed social welfare provision and coined the term “welfare 
queen” in 1976 in a symbolic gesture meant to appeal to racially stereotypical 
views of welfare mothers as black and undeserving.35  
● Massachusetts inmate Willie Horton, who was furloughed in 1987 during the 
administration of Michael Dukakis, and raped and tortured a Maryland couple, a 
fact exploited by the 1988 George Bush for President campaign manager Lee 
Atwater.36  
● Omi and Winant point out that President George H.W. Bush, in 1992, took a 
helicopter to a photographic opportunity in Los Angeles during the riots, in which 
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he deplored the chaos and violence that erupted as a result of failed social 
programs.37 
● In 1992, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton flew home to personally witness 
the execution of condemned and mentally challenged prisoner, African-American 
Ricky Ray Rector. Clinton also condemned rap star Sister Souljah and her violent 
lyrics.  In 1996, Clinton signed a bill that repealed welfare, flanked by black 
women who had formerly been enrolled in welfare.38  
● Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) ran a commercial in 1996 implying that his 
opponent, Democratic (and African-American) Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt, 
was a champion of affirmative action hiring practices, and that he was not “one of 
us.”39 
This is far from a comprehensive list or discussion of racial conservatism in national 
politics. It is meant to provide further emphasis about the salience of racial conservatism 
and to underscore the fact that to much of the white public, black dependency and 
criminality were the key social problems. 
The decade of the 1990s began with a still overwhelmingly white statewide 
population, but Suffolk County and its main constituent part, the city of Boston, were 
more of an outlier in state population than ever before. With nearly forty percent of the 
population not counted as white, there was perhaps never before a starker racial divide 
between “the Hub” and its surrounding counties.  Barnstable and Plymouth Counties 
continued to see an influx of residents, primarily white, and both had over 94% white 
populations to start.  Boston saw a decline of over 40,000 white residents in the 1990s, 
while the suburbs surrounding saw an increase of roughly 100,000. 
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It was in this political environment that William Weld, an ambitious prosecutor 
with an eye toward making a name for himself, emerged.40 Weld served in the Reagan 
Justice Department as Assistant Attorney General before leaving to run for office 
statewide in his home of Massachusetts.  He was never elected to office before41, but his 
media exposure as US Attorney for Eastern Massachusetts seemed to sufficiently prepare 
him for a statewide run for governor.  During his bid for the Republican nomination, 
Weld emphasized his career as a prosecutor in which he actively put criminals behind 
bars. Yet he also employed racial conservatism.  
Weld’s 1990 opponent, Democratic nominee John Silber, was also not innocent of 
employing racial conservatism.  In 1990, Silber 1990 ran an anti-welfare, anti-crime 
campaign, and in the spring 1989 he said publicly: "The fact is, young girls are having 
babies in order to drop out of school and get on welfare.”42 [emphasis added]  
 What raised Silber to the level of nearly an explicit racism was his behavior over 
the course of the primary campaign. For example, responding to a debate question later 
printed in the Boston Globe about why he had not addressed the residents of police-
designated “Area B” (including the neighborhoods of Roxbury, and parts of Dorchester 
and Mattapan), Silber responded: "I will tell you something about that area. There is no 
point in my making a speech on crime control to a group of drug addicts.”43 [emphasis 
added] One pundit remarked on what seemed to be the conventional wisdom in the wake 
of the controversy, that it ended the Democratic campaign.44   
In Weld’s debate with Silber, the racially conservative rhetoric of both campaigns 
was on full display. Drawing on assumptions about the alleged underclass, Weld stressed 
that welfare recepients should work in order to receive any benefits: 
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We need tough work requirements. If you don’t give people on welfare a 
deadline to go to work, on the whole, they don’t. I would suggest history has 
proven that over time.45 [emphasis added]  
 
Weld is, of course, playing to stereoptypes. He is insinuating to his audience that people on 
welfare (black and Latino women) are the problem, and not, say, unemployment, lack-of-
child care and other social services or poverty rates.  
By linking the epidemic of violent crime to gangs and drug dealers, Weld also played 
the “race card” in the debate. He asserted that there “is almost nowhere that is safe from the 
epidemic of violent crime.” And in an allusion to an issue that so damaged Dukakis’s 
presidential campaign he theorized “[p]People get mad as hell when they see somebody 
released from jail just a couple years after a vicious rape or a violent crime is committed.” 
But it was gangs that drew the greatest attention:  
“I think we’ve gotta focus on gang violence, on these gang members, dope dealers 
who are bringing weapons into Massachusetts.  And in order to do that, we need to 
increase the sentencing for the career criminals who are threatening us. The average 
career criminal commits 244 felonies a year. I say take him off the street for 10 
years with a mandatory minimum if he commits a crime with a firearm. I say lets 
get a state statute penalizing felons who possess firearms….That would do more to 
combat urban violence than any ban on .22 rifles which you yourself possess.” 
[emphasis added]  
 
After his election, as an incumbent Republican governor, he began to sound even 
more themes of law-and-order, about drugs, about crime, about the death penalty and 
about ending parole for violent offenders. This has to be understood from the standpoint 
of racial conservatism.  
In Boston, Republican support was at its highest for William Weld in 1990 and 
especially in his reelection in 1994. Weld ran on themes of corruption on Beacon Hill and 
absenteeism by his opponent Mark Roosevelt, a member of a distinguished family.  Weld 
clearly had an advantage in the 1994 election, riding a wave of Republican discontent 
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around the country with the Clintons’ health care plan failure, tax increase (aka economic 
stimulus package), and numerous unpopular foreign military interventions (Haiti, 
Somalia, and even the failure to intervene in Rwanda).  Newt Gingrich and Rush 
Limbaugh helped foment voter discontent around the United States in 1994 on the issues 
that they classified as “big government” and “welfare” and “crime.”  Weld did his best to 
highlight his identification with all of those issues, while amassing a campaign war chest 
as an incumbent, as well as running early ads demonizing his opponent and associating 
him as much as possible with a terrible professional image. 
Mark Roosevelt, for his part, seemed on paper to be a strong campaigner. 
However, he was hammered over the death penalty despite his campaign theme of 
education having been neglected by Governor Weld.46 
 In an October 1994 rally with Republican Senate nominee Mitt Romney, who 
was opposing Edward Kennedy that November, Weld proclaimed his accomplishments 
during his first four years: 
The people wanted the welfare system reformed. Well, we got in there, we kicked 
convicted criminals and drug abusers off the rolls! And we will continue 
fighting until every able-bodied person is working for a paycheck, not just 
collecting a welfare check. [emphasis added]  
 
The people of this state were fearful of crime. Well, we abolished early release on 
parole, we toughened up and we lengthened criminal sentences, and we built more 
prison cells so we could lock up the bad guys longer. And we will continue to 
fight to bring the death penalty back to Massachusetts. [emphasis added] 47 
 
Here again the themes of racial conservatism are plain. He is appealing to the 
fallacious view that 1) welfare is a problem, 2) that it is the source of much fraud and 
graft and 3) and that the solution was work requirements, rather than ending poverty for 
families and children.  
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The results of this election show that the Back Bay once again formed a core of 
support along with the Fenway, but a new phenomenon occurred as well: high majority 
support in the communities of Roslindale and Hyde Park, as well as South Boston.  
In his 1996 State of the State addressed as a Weld returned to the matter of 
welfare. 48  He shared the contents of a letter from a young (white) mother, whom he had 
invited to his address. In quoting and enthusiastically endorsing he letter, Weld read: 
I understand, if I was on welfare, I could go to a training school free. I could get a 
daycare voucher. I could get food stamps and a check every two weeks, Mr. Weld. 
That sounds to me, Mr. Weld, like luxury! Can you explain to me why I should 
not quit my job and go on welfare? [emphasis added]  
 
Governor Weld went on to discuss at length the evils of “illegitimacy” in which his use of 
teen pregnancy statistics was dubious in its characterization at best, disingenuous at 
worst.  He used once again, in the same speech, the rhetorical device of a young girl’s 
testimony (though this girl was not present at the address, but had spoken to a reporter): 
“A 16 year old recently told the Boston Globe that the main reason some of her teenage 
friends were having babies out of wedlock was to get welfare benefits.” It is important 
to note that the apparent race-neutral statement is anything but—whites opposed welfare 
because black women received benefits. 
Weld did read from a section on education policy, which had little to do with 
education per se: 
This year we are filing a bill to double the mandatory minimum for anyone 
who brings an illegal gun on school property, and if a kid brings a gun inside 
your child’s classroom, he should not be allowed in that classroom again. We also 
want to double the mandatory minimum penalties for anyone who deals drugs to 
kids. Along with guns and drugs, gang violence is one of the biggest threats to the 
safety of our kids and neighborhoods.  Violent gang members belong in prison, 
and we’re gonna keep on fighting for tough mandatory minimum penalties to 
keep them there. [emphasis added] 
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Weld’s insistence on emphasizing the issue of “gang violence” shows again the 
use of racial conservatism. He emphasizes “urban” schools and “drugs”—code words that 
convey the central point about black and brown deviance and criminality. 
On the subject of criminal justice and sentencing reform, Mr. Weld had a 
decidedly different view of judicial discretion in sentencing than former Governor Frank 
Sargent (who apparently believed in “flexibility” for judges and for a “parole board” that 
was “empowered”):  
You do hear the argument these days that mandatory minimums interfere with 
judge’s discretion. And I say, that’s right, that’s exactly what they’re 
supposed to do.  When the courts return dangerous criminals to the street 
corners as fast as police can haul them in, the public has a right to demand 
justice. The public has a right to say that people who prey on our neighborhoods 
and our children deserve to be in prison, and it shouldn’t be maybe. It should be 
mandatory. [emphasis added]  
 
Finally, Weld made sure his position was clear on restoring the death penalty: “Finally, 
for cop-killers, and for other cold-blooded murderers, there is only one penalty, the 
maximum penalty, the death penalty.” [emphasis added]  
The Senate seat he would vie for was held by the admired but not exceedingly 
loved junior Senator from the state, John F. Kerry. The Weld-Kerry contest proved to be 
one of the most competitive races in memory, but President Clinton’s popularity in the 
state and the reflexive inclination to vote Democratic during national election years 
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for Weld.49   
Before considering the career of Paul Cellucci, it is important to underscore a 
basic point: racial conservatism is correlated to support among white Bostonians. It 
functions more as an ideology than a coherent agenda which changes legitimate “public” 
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concerns about poverty, employment, welfare provision, drug use, etc., into ostensibly 
“private” concerns about bad behavior, delinquence, and immorality.50  
Weld’s successor, Paul Cellucci, had been his lieutenant governor for six years, 
and his running mate for a year before that. When assuming the post of “acting governor” 
upon the resignation of Weld in 1997, Cellucci soon announced he would be running for 
governor in his own right, and proposed several tax cuts that Weld had never enacted. 
Cellucci faced opposition to his election from the Attorney General, Scott Harshbarger. 
Harshbarger ran on a platform that included expanded and affordable health care, and his 
record as a consumer watchdog as Attorney General.51   
By contrast, Cellucci mixed traditional conservative positions, particularly 
pledges for lower taxes, with racial conservatism. During one debate with Attorney 
General Scott Harshbarger in the 1998 campaign for governor, Cellucci gave an extended 
answer about his philosophy of criminal justice. The crime that concerned him was street 
crime, happening in certain neighborhoods, certainly not suburban ones: 
We have very dangerous criminals, we have murderers, we have violent offenders 
and they need to be kept in a maximum security prison. There was a headline in 
the newspaper not too long ago, it said if crime is down, why are the prisons 
overcrowded? Well, because the prisons are overcrowded, crime is down, because 
we passed truth in sentencing and mandatory sentencing for drug pushers, we’ve 
got these people behind bars, they’re not out in the streets, and they’re not out 
in the neighborhoods, committing crime. So my answer to those who say we 
should weaken these laws, that we should repeal the minimum mandatory 
sentences, that we should weaken the truth in sentencing law, I say no way! If I 
get a bill like that to my desk, I’m gonna veto it. I say let’s build more prisons, 
let’s put public safety first.52 [emphasis added]   
 
One of the Boston Globe’s writers ridiculed Cellucci’s opponent, Attorney General Scott 
Harshbarger (despite the fact that the paper eventually endorsed him) by labeling him a 
“preachy activist” a nickname that seemed to stick throughout their coverage.53  
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After winning election in his own right, Cellucci focused in his State of the State 
addresses almost exclusively on education, in contrast to Weld.54  He promised 
maintenance of the Weld-Cellucci policy on welfare reform, but welfare went nearly 
unmentioned during his State of the State addresses save for some mentions of “putting 
people to work” but without a thorough defense of the program known as “workfare.” He 
had also sponsored a health care expansion for the poor using federal funds and funds 
from a large tobacco settlement that proved available in 1997 and 1998. During one of his 
campaign’s television commercials, a testimonial from a white, working man explained 
that he was able to provide health care for his family because of Governor Cellucci.  His 
signoff line in the ad was, “Hopefully I’ll be off of [Medicaid] soon and I’ll pass it on to 
someone who needs it more than I do.”55 [emphasis added]   Such a sentiment would 
only seem to make sense in a statewide campaign wherein the candidate and his 
predecessor had spent a great degree of time vilifying those who accept public assistance.   
Cellucci also pledged support for the death penalty, but not frequently and not as 
prominently as when he campaigned.  Cellucci proved to have an uneventful term save 
for the Big Dig.  Begun during the Dukakis administration, the Big Dig was the most 
expensive road construction project in American history.  It involved placing the high-
rise interstate highway that ran through Boston’s Little Italy, the North End, from which 
Cellucci drew majority support during his 1998 election, underground in a new tunnel. It 
promised a new revitalization of Boston’s downtown, with hopes that it would lead to a 
duplication of New York City’s Central Park.  It saw massive cost overruns, false starts, 
and, at the tail end, during the Romney administration, the collapse of the newly erected 
tunnels on a woman driving through it while her husband sat next to her, helpless. 
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Scandal, cost overruns, and even corruption were a large part of this urban redevelopment 
story, but Cellucci weathered it well.56  Cellucci stepped down in 2001, leaving the 
governor’s chair to his young lieutenant governor, Jane Swift, a former state senator from 
the rural Berkshire mountain region, 150 miles from Boston.  Swift, 36, was one of the 
youngest governors in the state’s history, and was clearly a newcomer to the rough-and-
tumble of Boston politics.  
In her lone State of the State message, Swift devoted the entirety of the speech to 
emphasizing new educational standardized testing, charter schools, and English 
immersion, all of which are fundamentally conservative Republican initiatives.57 
Education is normally the province of Democrats, however, and her emphasis on the 
issue (including her invitation to a young black student who had failed her first 
standardized test but was now receiving tutoring to re-take it) made her appear liberal. In 
actuality, standardized testing is a relatively conservative reform initiative as it involves 
little in the way of reallocating key education and financial resources. 
Swift had a very rocky tenure as acting governor, and a scandal damaged her 
career. Swift at the time had three young children, and lived on their family ranch in the 
Berkshires, over 150 miles from Boston. Thus, she received helicopter and limousine 
rides from the state capitol back to her home on a regular basis, paid for with 
governmental funds.  She also gave birth to twins while in office, and conducted cabinet 
meetings from her hospital bed soon thereafter, which was controversial, though popular.  
Boston was also the embarkation point for nineteen Saudi Arabian members of al-Qaeda 
who successfully crashed their plane into the New York World Trade Center.  The head 
of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, which runs the Boston’s Logan 
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Airport, was forced to resign shortly after September 11, and the head of security at 
Logan Airport was under as much pressure as the MBTA chief and Swift herself.58  
Acting Governor Swift’s popularity plummeted. When the prospect of Mitt 
Romney heading the 2002 Republican gubernatorial ticket emerged as a possibility, he 
outpolled her among Republican primary voters by 75-12 in the last poll before she 
bowed out of the race. Romney had impressive credentials when he arrived, seemingly 
out of nowhere in 2002—a joint law and business degree from Harvard University, a 
history as one of the top venture capitalists ever to do business in Boston, and even as a 
religious leader to the small Mormon community in the larger Boston region.  He also 
had just seemingly rescued the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002 in the face of a scandal-
plagued and financially insolvent Olympic organization before his entry.   
His movie-star good looks and middle age, along with his vast personal fortune 
and professional pedigree, made him an ideal candidate. The support for Romney was so 
enthusiastic that many began to speak about him as a potential future presidential 
candidate, before he had even officially received the Republican nomination for governor 
of Massachusetts. 
Romney’s strategy was not that different from that which he ran against the iconic 
Democratic Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy in 1994. Romney garnered an impressive 
45% of the vote in a state where the Kennedy name, reputation, and ideology is often 
regarded as synonymous with the political culture of the state.59 Nevertheless, Romney 
earned those votes in a year when William Weld, the incumbent Republican governor, 
managed to win 70% of the votes statewide, and Republicans nationally captured a net 73 
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.  So in a Republican watershed year, Romney 
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had almost won, but did not win. He lost despite the fact that he was a textbook 
Republican candidate, raising money on his own and taking stances (i.e. on abortion) that 
allowed him to compete in the state, while emphasizing racial conservatism.  Romney’s 
chief campaign themes are captured during a 1994 campaign rally with Weld:  
Neither the people who are on welfare nor the people who are paying for 
welfare think that that’s the answer for getting people back to work. In the real 
world, people recognize who are senior citizens that you don’t want to have 
recovering drug addicts moving into housing centers that were placed for senior 
citizens….being tough on crime, tough on welfare [sic].60 [emphasis added]  
 
In defining “recovering drug addicts” as unworthy of public housing and championing 
the victimhood of needy senior citizens, Romney sets himself up as the defender of 
middle-class, white Massachusetts voters. What is noteworthy is that, in 1994, these 
statements were not credible positions in an era of occupational downsizing and 
outsourcing, relatively flat household income, rising consumer credit and trade 
agreements that were arguably tied to all those aforementioned trends. Property crime in 
Massachusetts was down in 1994, and in 2002, property crime was lower than it had been 
since 197861; and welfare never was more than roughly $25 billion per year (in constant 
1993 dollars) from its creation in 1970 until its end in 1994, representing only a small 
fraction of the overall federal budget. Neveretheless, Romney did better against Ted 
Kennedy for that Senate seat than any other Republican ever had (despite ultimately 
losing to Kennedy) by stressing these campaign themes first championed by Reagan and 
further carried to victory in Massachusetts by Weld. 
Eight years later, Romney relied on similar rhetoric. Romney’s campaign rhetoric 
largely ignored Swift, and called the Beacon Hill leadership and his opponent, State 
Treasurer Shannon O’Brien, the “Gang of Three.” Running against a “Beacon Hill” 
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triumvirate that could easily have been replaced with “Capitol Hill” in his rhetoric, 
Romney also capitalized on the Republican wave that resulted from the popularity of 
President George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11. He emphasized the need for a fresh start 
for the state, and characterized Democrats as “bureaucrats” who did too much 
“bickering.”  Of O’Brien, he told her to her face during a one-on-one debate that her 
conduct was “unbecoming” eliciting widespread charges of condescension and sexism 
from his critics.  
On crime, he was not as silent as Swift had been. In his opening remarks in front 
of his posh Belmont estate, he asserted, without elaboration: “Our streets are not as safe 
as they should be.”62 [emphasis added]  During a response to a reporter’s question in 
which the death penalty was now being called into question in many states due to the 
widespread use of DNA evidence to clear longtime death row inmates, Romney 
responded that he was still an enthusiastic backer of capital punishment:  
Science is our friend! We now have the ability through DNA testing. And other 
scientific forensic capabilities, to determine whether there is incontrovertible 
evidence associated with a particular conviction. And what I would like to do is in 
the case of certain heinous crimes: terrorism, murder of witnesses to trials, crimes 
of terrible abuse towards children, the likes of which we’re reading about in our 
papers, I’d like to make sure that in those cases, the death penalty is an option. I’d 
have a trial where there is a conviction based on surpassing the standard of 
without a reasonable doubt. But then I’d also have a separate procedure, which 
would be based upon assuring there is incontrovertible evidence that the person is 
guilty. And in that circumstance, where there’s a heinous crime, and such clear 
evidence, I believe the death penalty is necessary. It deters such crimes. It is the 
right thing to do. And I’m convinced it will make a difference for the safety of the 
people of Massachusetts, and that’s why I support it.63 [emphasis added]  
 
 
So again in an era when the rates of violent crime were down, Romney continued to 
make political use of concerns about “street crime,” and ostensibly weak sentencing for 
defendants sentenced for murder. 
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Needless to say, none of those suggestions were ever implemented, though the 
condescension in the room was palpable, even on videotape. In fact, the death penalty as 
an issue was never formally addressed again during Romney’s term of office. The verbal 
and rhetorical gymnastics he did in that moment did speak to a cornerstone of the Weld-
Romney strategy that Romney would ditch: harsh punishments for criminal offenders, a 
stance that was not neutral, but pregnant with racial connotations. He had done what was 
necessary to achieve his goals: he made substantive policy suggestions in the 
conservative direction of both crime and welfare, as well as education. He had also run 
commercials substantively mimicking Swift’s idea on English immersion in schools for 
non-native English speakers. In large letters, next to his smiling face, one commercial 
showed : “End Bilingual Education” which has much more of a harsh tinge than a slogan 
that might have read instead “Promote English Immersion.” Still, Romney won the 
election with a decisive, if not comfortable margin. Romney became the third consecutive 
Republican to win the governor’s race. This owed itself, partly, to demographic trends 
among relevant constituencies, and the ongoing appeal of racial conservatism in 
gubernatorial elections.   
In these elections, which truly represent the zenith of Republican strength with 
Paul Cellucci and Mitt Romney guiding the way respectively in 1998 and 2002, the south 
counties of Barnstable and Plymouth continue to provide the base of support they always 
did, along with the North Shore county of Essex, and the exurb county of Worcester.  The 
coalition of this era is unlike the Republican coalition of the Sargent-Brooke era, having 
achieved margins of victory statewide without even approaching a majority in the capital 
of Boston.  Map 1 and Map 2, found in the Appendix, illustrate the average Republican 
 111 
 
coalition in the Sargent-Brooke 1970s (the 1974 election being the most representative) 
and the Republican coalition in the 1990s (the 1998 election being the most 
representative).64 
The ward-based returns already show that Romney allowed support to decline 
even in white-majority districts, but South Boston and Charlestown voted as they did for 
Cellucci. Precinct-based returns show that Romney won several precincts in Irish South 
Boston and the Italian North End. He won a majority in none of the neighborhoods in the 
City of Boston, marking a decidedly grand shift from the Weld-Cellucci coalition, which 
relied on Italian and Irish neighborhoods in the Hub to provide their margins of victory 
statewide. Romney was unconcerned, and spent the next four years acting as a fairly 
conservative governor on economic and social issues.  He even underwent a conversion 
for which he would later be criticized, that of “pro-choice” on abortion during the 2002 
campaign to “pro-life” before the end of his term as governor in 2007.65   
Even then his strategy seemed to be aimed at the White House, and his decisions 
and his rhetoric reflected national, rather than Massachusetts-specific, concerns.  He 
spoke of lower taxes and regulations, and told union members he disagreed with back pay 
for union negotiated collective bargaining agreements, saying it was against his 
“philosophy” (attempting to essentially take away any bargaining power from public 
sector unions at all). He continued the Weld assault on “illegitimacy” when discussing 
welfare: “I will propose that we put meaningful work requirements in welfare and that we 
insist that absentee fathers—not taxpayers—are held financially responsible for their 
own children.”66 He even stressed an anti-welfare policy position that was fundamentally 
out of date, a vestigial relic of the Reagan-Weld rhetoric, and now with the enxistence of 
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a new social welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), was a 
fait accompli: “I'm putting money into childcare programs so that every able-bodied 
person can have the dignity of working for their benefits.”67 
He went on: 
While the rest of the country fully implemented workfare, Massachusetts did 
not…It's past time to bring real welfare reform to Massachusetts. People from 
both political parties have long recognized that welfare without work creates 
negative incentives that lead to permanent poverty. It robs people of self-esteem. 
But today, only 20 percent of welfare recipients in Massachusetts are 
working. [emphasis added]  
 
This year, we will take a close look at all our welfare programs to make sure they 
are serving as a safety net and not a poverty trap. And work requirements must 
be provided wherever possible. Let's make sure we are giving people the 
opportunity to achieve independent and fulfilling lives. [emphasis added]  
 
 
His signature achievement, of course, was RomneyCare, and this was his justification of 
it during his State of the State message in 2006: 
First, the stage is set for something truly historic. We are poised to provide 
private, market-based health insurance to all our uninsured citizens. This isn’t 
government taking over healthcare and dictating who gets treated for what 
and by whom. No, it’s government helping people take over healthcare, to get 
healthcare working for them. Think about it: 500,000 people, all without health 
insurance today, will have quality preventative care, prescription benefits, and 
hospitalization coverage. [emphasis added]  
 
Romney’s health program was much friendlier to insurance interests in the state 
than “government taking over health care and dictating who gets treated for what and by 
whom,” and was created by the same consultants that later developed the federal 
“ObamaCare” plan in 2010, and was largely similar—a health care exchange that 
subsidized some low-income buyers, and mandated that everyone in the state purchase 
some kind of insurance if they did not already have it.68 
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Romney’s calculus did not take into consideration the health of the Massachusetts 
Republican party whatsoever, though. He did not direct resources toward Republican 
legislative candidates during the state “midterms” of 2004 (a presidential election year), 
nor did he signal until late 2005 that he would not be a candidate for re-election in 2006.  
He immediately began fundraising and campaigning for the 2008 Republican presidential 
nomination, for which he fell short, losing to John McCain.69  
Perhaps what is most noteworthy, however, is not Romney’s implicit racialized 
language in the form of crime, welfare, and health care policy, but his explicit language 
in regards to education policy. Knowing that racialized, segregated education has been an 
issue in Massachusetts since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and well into the 
modern era, Romney did not hesitate to discuss and perpetuate the racial stereotypes that 
already exist in the mind of white voters when he gave his State of the State message in 
2005: 
But there are troubling gaps. There is still much to do. Kids in our urban schools, 
most of them minorities, are not succeeding at anywhere near the rate of their 
counterparts in the suburbs. And let me be clear: the failure of our urban schools 
to prepare our children today for the challenges of tomorrow is the civil rights 
issue of our generation. ….Ten years ago, it was felt that if we provided equal 
funding for urban schools, the disparity would just disappear. It has not. Yet there 
will be some who will simply cry for even more money. But we know money 
alone is not the answer . . . . Many of the features I will offer will apply only to 
failing districts. Here are a few: 1) A longer school day, with provision for special 
help, study hall and sports. Learning should last well into the afternoon, not end at 
2 o'clock. 2) Our best teachers are underpaid. They deserve more and I want to 
pay them more. Finally, I will propose, again, mandatory parental preparation 
courses in failing school districts. Parental involvement in a child's education is 
more important than any step we can take. Not all teachers can be parents, but all 
parents must be teachers.”70 [emphasis added]  
 
Romney is capitalizing on the traditional white racial stereotype of black culture 
that absentee fathers (a term, incidentally, he regularly also used in State of the State 
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addresses) are the root cause of the lower socioeconomic status endured by African-
Americans.  Parental involvement was thought to be the answer. By drawing on racial 
stereotype, policy prescriptions flatten and simplify a very complicated problem, that 
starts with high rates of child poverty.   It is difficult to imagine a more explicit and 
official governmental proclamation that faults racial minority populations for for their 
own disadvantage.  
Conclusion 
Racial conservatism, thus, is an apt frame of analysis for Massachusetts elections. 
Whether or not it is determinative or not of electoral outcomes, it is clearly present in 
Massachusetts’ (and national) politics in the post-Civil Rights era. Whether the themes of 
racial conservatism are emphasized are no longer in dispute. Whether those racial 
conservatism themes make an electoral impact on neighborhoods that are particularly 
focused on racial politics such as Southie and Roxbury may still be argued, but a 
preponderance of evidence of its use and its impact certainly exists, as is seen in both 
Chapters 3 and 4. Racial alliances that incorporate political networks and institutions 
within them are clearly working when racial conservatism is invoked. Racial 
conservatism is a clear manifestation of racial orders perpetuating themselves.  Thus, the 
presence of racial conservatism in Boston elections demonstrates that American racial 
alliances are as present in Massachusetts as they are in any American state, and as present 
in Boston as in any American city. The next question actually becomes not whether racial 
conservatism and racial alliances exist, but whether both will operate in the same way by 
political actors in the succeeding eras.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear in this analysis that, in the era since the end of the Civil Rights 
movement, Massachusetts Republicans have responded to increasing white flight from 
urban centers and the suburbanization of Massachusetts by adopting a strategy of 
promoting the most racialized form of conservatism, which involves heavily invoking 
white fears of black crime and white stereotypes of black laziness in partisan 
mobilization. The effects of this strategy are in evidence by analyzing electoral maps of 
the city of Boston, which reveal that the only competitive areas for Republicans in the 
city are those with overwhelming white majorities and that areas are those which have 
particular histories around civil rights issues like busing.  
By eliminating the rural or suburban variable, one sees a clearer picture of which 
voters make up the Republican party in Boston, one of the chief bastions of liberalism in 
America. What emerges in those elections in which Republicans were successful is an 
emphasis on the aspects of urban life such as street crime and government anti-poverty 
programs, that play upon stereotypical views about poor blacks and Latinos. This 
dissertation follows the changing demographics of neighborhoods with close attention to 
racial conservatism with respect to candidates for state office (especially governor).  
A brief review of the findings shows the evolution of racial conservatism. 
Governor Sargent proposed that the state eliminate the department of Public Welfare, but 
also promised to integrate the schools. Senator Brooke told welfare mothers and under-
educated black residents that they should want to work.  Ed King proposed saving money 
for the people of the state by depriving some people of benefits, in other words, by 
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“tightening restrictions” on welfare in a similar way that Reagan did, even bringing in 
Reagan’s old welfare commissioner for advice. Reagan’s political operatives helped craft 
the Willie Horton message for the 1988 Bush campaign, and then proceeded to take over 
the Massachusetts Republican party and elect one of their own, William Weld, to the 
Beacon Hill corner office with a message of ending welfare and bringing back the death 
penalty. Weld won despite the fact that the Democratic candidate, John Silber, used the 
same racial tropes to win the Democratic nomination in 1990.  Indeed, in the 1990s and 
early 2000s the Republicans won four straight elections with this strategy.   
Why? From what can be observed about white response to racial messaging, 
implicit appeals work better than explicit ones. Voters accepted the messages about 
criminality, dependency and so forth, and endorsed it, because the appeals drew on more 
latent racial and ethnic stereotypes.  Terms like “people on welfare” or “welfare mothers” 
conjured the image of the stereotypical poor black woman. The trope of the “criminal” is 
imagined to black man. Willie Horton was an exemplar of this trope because he was also 
a rapist of a woman who was white. So it is thus that the invocations of “crime” and 
“welfare” were classic redressing of the old racial tropes of criminal black men and poor 
black women. 
On one hand, candidates almost cannot be blamed for adopting such a strategy, 
because it won votes. However, such an analytical absolution excuses all manner of 
ruthless electioneering, and discounts the damage racial conservatism does to authentic 
and credible policy debate on a range of public policy issues that have little to do with 
law enforcement or cash assistance to the poor.  
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A second major point concerns the city of Boston as the case that carries 
implications for the study of American politics more broadly. The neighborhoods of 
Boston are fundamentally meant as a surrogate for the neighborhoods of the American 
city, and indeed, as a surrogate for America as a whole, and should not be viewed as a 
highly particular, racially conservative outlier in American cities. In fact, Boston, 
according to a recent paper published in the American Political Science Review, is one of 
the six most politically liberal cities in the United States.1 There is everywhere in 
America a Little Italy, a Chinatown, a black neighborhood, a new Latino neighborhood, a 
wealthy neighborhood, and a working-class white neighborhood. Before the Civil Rights 
era, there were no doubt elections won and lost in the city of Boston and the state of 
Massachusetts by pitting ethnic groups against one another.  There is also no doubt that 
Boston is not alone among major cities in such a distinction. What is striking is how 
penetrative the language has been in the post-Civil Rights era, and the extent to which the 
majority backlash against has been making and breaking gubernatorial elections in 
Massachusetts for over four decades.   
As discussed in chapter 4, and as detailed by Tali Mendelberg in her analysis 
1994, the “race card” was ubiquitous in gubernatorial politics in Massachusetts and 
elsewhere. She cites the gubernatorial elections, primarily, as fertile ground for racial 
priming: 
Republican governors who have risen to prominence in recent years, such as 
[Ridge, Jeb Bush, Pataki] all ran election campaigns that featured ads attacking 
their opponents for being lax on violent crime. These messages, by design or by 
circumstances, whether on their own or as conveyed by the news media, tended 
implicitly to refer to violent black criminals. Other prominent Republican 
governors were elected in part by highlighting their tough anti-welfare stance, a 
message that the media often conveys with visual references to African 
Americans.2 
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While perhaps playing the race card has not been as successful a strategy since the 
mid-1990s, it is a strategy which Massachusetts Republicans stuck to for a long time. 
Indeed racial conservatism is a recognizable factor in each of the major Republican 
statewide runs after 2002. 
Post-Racial Conservatism? 
Another point is more speculative, but it may be that racial conservatism has 
outlived its utility. After four straight Republican victories, the 2006 race for governor 
seemed primed for a Democratic win.  Deval Patrick, a former assistant U.S. attorney for 
Civil Rights in the Clinton administration, had practiced law in the private sector since 
2001. A native of Chicago, Patrick entered the elite secondary boarding school Milton 
Academy in Milton, Massachusetts on a scholarship, and went on to earn a law degree 
from Harvard University.  Patrick mounted an insurgent campaign that was garnering 
significant support. 
Racial conservatism did not work in 2006. Running against the Republican 
nominee and incumbent Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey, Deval Patrick was able to 
successfully name and accuse the Healey campaign of race-baiting. It would have been a 
difficult case to make against Healey, the Ph.D. in Criminology, except that Healey had 
made a reference to Patrick’s sister being a victim of marital rape in 1993, more than a 
decade in the past.3 A television ad also made reference to Patrick’s history as a defense 
attorney who represented other alleged rapists.4 This was merely the last desperate tactic 
of her campaign, and it backfired. Patrick won every neighborhood in Boston and every 
county in Massachusetts. His support was strongest, however, in Dorchester and 
 122 
 
Roxbury, where he received more than 90% of the vote, in much the same style as former 
Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis and former Republican Senator Edward Brooke.5 
As governor, Patrick continued to slash budgets, even more so than Romney had 
done. Romney had not raised taxes, and Patrick, seeking to assuage moderates, pledged 
not to raise taxes, either. Despite his progressive campaign themes, Patrick aggressively 
asked his new department heads to submit budget requests with a five to ten percent 
expenditure reduction in order to compensate for the state’s rising Medicaid 
contribution.6  He proved a popular governor, however, and saw the implementation of 
the new health care exchanges under his administration. When the major insurance 
carriers sought to raise the rates significantly after the first year of the new program, 
Patrick attempted to negotiate with them to lower the cost of their premiums.7  
One of those executives, Charlie Baker, formerly policy architect of Weld’s 
welfare reform law CEO of Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a large insurance carrier based 
only in Massachusetts, successfully sought the Republican nomination to run for 
governor against Patrick in 2010.8  Patrick won re-election handily, again winning every 
ward in the city of Boston.9 He largely saw similar margins in each neighborhood to his 
old classmate Barack Obama, who had won the 2008 presidential election with help from 
his victorious Boston and Massachusetts showing, despite running against a former 
Massachusetts governor, Romney. 
If racial conservatism does not work, even against an African American 
candidate, why would that be? Perhaps racial conservatism is historically bounded—that 
it would be effective while the policy legacies of the 1960s were still resonant in city, 
state and national politics. But by the beginning of the 21st century that cannot be said. 
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Racial conservatism as policy has replaced racial liberalism: welfare was “reformed,” the 
prison population expanded, affirmative action policies were scaled back if not 
eliminated, and busing has disappeared as a remedy to racial segregation in schools.  
Or perhaps racial resentment becomes manifest in a different way. In 2009, soon 
after assuming office, President Obama began negotiating to draft and pass new 
legislation that would overhaul the nation’s health care system. There were several 
options to choose from, but those experts tasked with designing the plan were the same 
experts who had designed the Massachusetts legislation that Mitt Romney had signed and 
Governor Deval Patrick had overseen. So, it was perhaps a foregone conclusion that the 
bill would look similar in character.  However, President Obama failed to recognize how 
unpopular this bill might be to those who already have insurance, and that included 
residents of the Bay State who now had a nation-leading 97% of residents covered under 
some type of health care plan since RomneyCare was implemented by Governor Patrick.  
In a sad twist of irony, the leading advocate for a system of nationally-run and subsidized 
health care, Senator Ted Kennedy, died soon after the inauguration of President Obama, 
who was intent on passing the bill Kennedy was sponsoring.  The “Kennedy Seat” would 
now be up for election.10   
Capitalizing on voter confusion and racial resentment that Tesler has documented,  
Scott Brown, a plainspoken Republican state senator with a thick Boston accent and a 
signature pickup truck he drove while campaigning (to symbolize is working class 
sympathies), defeated Democratic Attorney General Martha Coakley on January 19, 
2010. This marked the fourth time in twelve years that a state constitutional officer lost 
an election for governor or senator (after Harshbarger, O’Brien, and Reilly all went down 
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to defeat in primaries or general elections), so it is not surprising in hindsight. At the 
time, however, the shock was felt due to the exponential rise in the polls of the previously 
unknown Brown. Coakley was castigated by the press (and the Obama administration 
press office) for her comment that Brown was seemingly campaigning too vigorously.11 
Despite a personal visit from President Obama, the special election was lost to Brown, 
who, for the first time since 1998, cracked the Democratic stronghold in the city of 
Boston by winning a majority of votes in both of the two South Boston wards.  
 
2010 and Beyond 
 
In several neighborhoods within Suffolk County, there is barely a white 
population, such as in the planning districts of Roxbury and Mattapan.  Barnstable still 
has the highest percentage of whites in their population, and that proportion is the only 
one above 90% in metropolitan Boston. The neighborhoods with the highest proportion 
of white residents in Boston are the Back Bay (81%) South Boston (79%) and 
Charlestown (76%). These majorities can thus no longer guarantee support for 
conservative candidates. South Boston was where Republicans once garnered some 
support, but even the Back Bay is no longer a bastion for the party. Republicans are 
winning, it is the contention of this thesis, similar levels of support among whites in these 
neighborhoods as they are achieving outside of these communities, but their support does 
not register because it is of course more than simply whites who vote in elections. In 
2006 and 2010 the Republicans performed well in their bases—90% white South Shore 
Barnstable and Plymouth counties—but did not come close to cracking the 30% margin 
in Boston in either election. 
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As a result of the massive demographic change in Boston, it is safe to say that 
Republicans have largely abandoned the city to compete almost exclusively in the 
suburbs. Republicans are not reaching out to minorities in these communities and indeed, 
in some cases, are achieving higher margins among whites in these communities which 
will not help them in the long run. What is abundantly clear is that even if the 
Republicans are doing well in their traditional bases, they are losing elections partially 
because they have not done enough minority outreach, and there must be an underlying 
reason for this. Either the Massachusetts Republican Party is ignorant about how to 
achieve such outreach, or their program is inherently hostile to most minority residents of 
Boston. It is worth discussion. 
Boston as a whole is representative of the party identification change taking place 
in Massachusetts in terms of the decrease in voters registered as Democratic and the 
increase in un-enrolled voters. The Republican percentage in Massachusetts has 
decreased by roughly half overall, but stays relatively constant in Boston. A possible 
conclusion from this analysis is that the same demographic trend is occurring in both the 
city and the state, but that it’s simply more pronounced in Boston. These trends partly 
reflect changes in racial and ethnic demographics. 
 While Democrats have accepted the black majorities of Roxbury and now 
Mattapan and Dorchester into their coalition, it is not until recently that African 
Americans represent the cornerstone of the Democratic electoral coalition in the city. 
They certainly are still not that cornerstone in the state.  Despite the election of the first 
black governor in the state’s history, racial disparities continue to shape Massachusetts 
politics and public policy. Welfare has been reformed, “crime” of certain types is down 
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across many measures, but health care for the poor has never been popular in 
Massachusetts overall. Scott Brown proved that while campaigning against the health 
care law in his special election in 2010. It is perhaps on new fronts—e.g. funding for 
Medicaid or immigration—where implicit appeals to race might matter in coming years. 
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that racial conservatism is past its heyday. 
Whatever the future of Massachusetts politics, racial conservatism was clearly the 
dominant electoral strategy and ideology of candidates for governor of the Republican 
and sometimes Democratic party in the post-Civil Rights era. 
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